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I. INTRODUCTION
The limited liability of the corporate shareholder is a traditional cornerstone
both in Anglo-American corporation law and in the corporation law of the civil
system. The doctrine of limited liability protects the ultimate investor in the
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enterprise from the liabilities of the enterprise in excess of the investor's capital
investment. When applied to corporate groups (i.e., the parent and its subsidiaries
collectively conducting a business enterprise) limited liability protects not only
the ultimate investors from the debts of the enterprise, but also each of the
corporations into which the enterprise has been fragmented. Each corporation
is protected from liability for obligations of the other fragments of the enterprise.
Limited liability for the enterprise has become limited liability for each of the
successive tiers within the enterprise. According to traditional doctrine, such
corporate groups enjoy the same benefits of limited liability as the common law
has historically afforded to the individual investor in a corporate enterprise.
Today, multinational corporations organized in the form of a parent cor-
poration with dozens or even hundreds of subsidiary corporations' conduct most
of the world's business. Limited liability has been carried unthinkingly beyond
the original objective2 of insulating the ultimate investor from the debts of the
enterprise. Limited liability now enables a corporate group organized in tiers of
companies to insulate each corporate tier of the group, and thus, achieve layers
of insulation for the parent corporation from liability for the obligations of its
numerous subsidiaries. In light of recent environmental disasters of worldwide
dimensions, reexamination of the traditional doctrine of limited liability as applied
to corporate groups has emerged as an issue of major importance.
Although limited liability has received increasing academic attention in recent
years from scholars primarily interested in the application of economics to the
law, these discussions have given only secondary attention to the special problems
presented by corporate groups. Further, scholarly analysis has failed to review
the historical and legal roots of limited liability of corporate groups. This Article
constitutes the first attempt at a comprehensive discussion of the legal, historical,
and economic dimensions of the problem.
In summary, the Article makes five conclusions. First, limited liability did
not spring irresistably from the concept of the corporation as a separate legal
1. In 1982, the 1,000 largest American industrial corporations had an average of 48 subsidiaries
each. See P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF
PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 464-68 (1983). Mobil Oil Corporation, to take an extreme
example, operated in 62 different countries through 525 subsidiaries. Id. at 465; Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425, 428 (1980).
Professor Hadden reports that British-based multinationals are even more complex. His study
of five large British groups (British Petroleum, Unilever, Bowater, Rank Organization, and Reckitt
& Colman) reveals an "incredible complexity" involving "an intricate network of sub-holding
companies, operating subsidiaries, sub-sidiaries and service companies." British Petroleum has
1200 to 1300 subsidiaries and Unilever has 800 subsidiaries. Hadden, Inside Corporate Groups, 12
INT'L J. SOC. L. 271, 273 (1984). Another British scholar has estimated that the average number
of subsidiaries in the top fifty British companies in 1981 was 230. See R. TRICKER, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, CH. 3 (1984), cited in T. HADDEN, R. FORBES & R. SIMMONDS, CANADIAN BUSINESS
OROANIZATION LAW 618 (1984).
2. As shown hereinafter, limited liability became firmly established as the general rule in
the United States by 1830, while the power of a corporation, to acquire and own shares of another
corporation, and thus to form corporate groups, generally was not available until after 1889.
Although subsidiary corporations were not unknown earlier, they occurred only as a result of express
provisions in the special charters to the parent corporation. The application of the doctrine of
limited liability to insulate parent corporations from liability as well as the ultimate investors apparently
occurred unthinkingly as a consequence of the recognition of the separate legal identity of a
corporation from its shareholders. The author has found no cases of the period that discuss the
significance of such double insulation from liability.
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person. Substantial industrial development took place both in England and in
the United States under legal systems imposing liability on shareholders for
corporate obligations before limited liability emerged in the United States around
1825 and in England in 1855. Limited liability is a statutory development that
represents the triumph of the rising political power of business interests.
Second, even after the general acceptance of limited liability, important
pockets of unlimited shareholder liability, pro rata liability, or double and even
triple shareholder liability survived in the United States until the Great Depression
of 1929-1932. Whether or not limited liability is the preferable legal rule, this
history of the development of limited liability demonstrates that limited liability
is not essential for large scale economic activity.
Third, limited liability came relatively late on the scene, but even so, it
was firmly established before the dramatic change in the law that permitted
corporations generally to acquire shares in other corporations, and thus to form
corporate groups. In the United States, corporations generally were not permitted
to own shares of other corporations until late in the nineteenth century. With
this development, described as a "turning point in American business his-
tory," 3 major business was soon transformed into large complexes of affiliated
corporations collectively conducting the business of the enterprise. In the corporate
group, limited liability for the corporate components of the enterprise, as well
as for the ultimate investors, followed automatically. This development appeared
to have followed without any recognition that the principle was receiving a
dramatic extension.
Fourth, in the judgment of almost all economic analysts, limited liability
serves a number of valuable purposes for the ultimate investor by creating a
more efficient economic system. Most of these theoretical advantages, however,
are valid only when limited liability is interposed for the protection of the
ultimate investors in the enterprise. In most cases, these considerations simply
become irrelevant when limited liability is interposed for the protection of
corporate shareholders who comprise the upstream tiers in a multi-tiered corporate
group.
Finally, limited liability that insulates shareholders, particularly parent cor-
porations, from liability for the claims of involuntary creditors of the controlled
corporation causes even economists convinced of the utility of limited liability
generally to concede that limited liability raises serious problems because it
enables the enterprise to externalize its costs. Tort creditors are the classic example
of involuntary creditors, but such externalization occurs in the case of every
transaction where parties are not in a practical position to negotiate credit terms.
The term "involuntary creditors" thus includes many trade creditors, consumers,
and workers as well as tort creditors. The groups adversely affected by limited
liability, unfortunately, are numerous.
In brief, limited liability, like any other legal rule, serves certain underlying
policies that are intended to achieve certain objectives. In circumstances in which
the application of limited liability no longer appears to serve such policies or
contribute to such objectives, limited liability, like any other legal rule that does
3. See A. CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CORPORATE ENTERPRISE 30 (1962).
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not serve its presumed purposes, must be reexamined critically. This reexamination
is particularly important in the case of corporate groups where entity law, the
traditional view of corporation law, is already in the process of erosion in areas
where imposition of substantive liability and rejection of limited liability generally
is not involved, such as procedure and bankruptcy.4 Entity law was firmly part
of the corporation law well before the emergence of limited liability, but the
principle of limited liability strongly reinforced it and clearly has been responsible
for its continued survival. With increasing signs portending the collapse of entity
law in its application to components of corporate groups in a number of areas,
reexamination of limited liability appears all the more useful.
The most pressing worldwide concerns with the insulation of multinational
parent corporations from liability for the acts of their subsidiaries relate to torts
of a magnitude and widespread impact unimaginable a few years ago: oil spills
in the English Channel affecting miles of coastline, the disaster in Bhopal killing
or injuring thousands of nearby residents, and dangerous products impairing
the health of large classes of workers and consumers. This combination of
multinational corporate groups and complex torts is another factor making the
reexamination of the application of limited liability to corporate groups even
more vital. In light of such recent disasters focusing worldwide attention on the
responsibility of foreign multinational enterprises for the conduct of their sub-
sidiaries, the problem has moved from the academic to the popular arena.
It. HISTORY or LIMITED LIABILITY
The traditional view of the corporation in Anglo-American law, as well as
in other Western legal systems, has firmly embraced entity law: the concept that
a corporation is a separate legal person with its own rights and obligations,
distinct from those of its shareholders. The concept of the corporation as a
separate legal entity ultimately led to the acceptance of the very different doctrine
of limited liability: the rule that shareholders are not liable for the obligations
of the corporation beyond their capital investment.
Despite widespread confusion on the matter, it is clear that the entity view
of the corporation rests essentially on philosophical notions and that this view
was firmly established well before acceptance of the principle of limited liability.
Limited liability emerged at a much later stage in the development of the
corporation. It arose in the wake of the acceptance of the entity concept, but
not as a necessary consequence.
The principle of limited liability is associated with the dramatic growth of
economic activity in the United States, and has received extravagant praise as
a beneficent policy of profound economic implications.' Notwithstanding more
4. See P. BLUMBERG, supra note I; P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS
IN THE BANKRUPTCY OR REORGANIZATION OF PARENT & SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS INCLUDING THE
LAW OF CORPORATE GUARANTIES (1985).
5. President Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia University opined that "the limited liability
corporation is the greatest single invention of modern times." See N. BUTLER, WHY SHOULD WE
CHANGE OUR FORM OF GOVERNMENT? 82 (1912). President Charles W. Eliot of Harvard University
concurred, terming limited liability as "by far the most effective legal invention for business purposes
made in the nineteenth century." See Cook, "'Watered Stock"--Commissions- "Blue Sky Laws"
19861
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critical evaluation in recent analyses,6 such sweeping acceptance fairly reflects
the conventional wisdom of the legal community and the view widely held by
the bench in approaching problems involving the liability of shareholders, in-
cluding parent corporations, for the obligations of a corporation.
The concept of limited liability and the strong pressure for its implementation
have firmly shaped the view of Anglo-American law on the acceptance of entity
law. A corporation law that turns on the concept of entity could have been
reached solely in reliance on the philosophical concepts underlying the view of
the corporation as a separate legal person, but it is inconceivable that judicial
application of the doctrine of entity would have been so strong. Accordingly,
any examination of the imposition of substantive liability upon parent corpo-
rations for the obligations of their subsidiaries requires understanding of the
place of limited liability in corporate history and corporate law.
A. The Emergence of Limited Liability in England (1855)1
1. Early Development
At the time of the American Revolution, English corporation law, emerging
from its misty historical origins in ecclesiastical and public corporations and
reflecting concepts derived from medieval versions" of Roman law,9 was still in
- Stock Without Par Value, 19 MICH. L. REV. 583 n.4 (1921). The Economist provides a final
example: "The economic historian of the future may assign to the nameless inventor of the principle
of limited liability ... a place of honor with Watt and Stephenson. and other pioneers of the
Industrial Revolution." B. HUNT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN ENGLAND,
1800-1867, at 116 (1936) (quoting The Economist, Dec. 18, 1926).
6. See generally LIMITED LIABILITY AND THE CORPORATION (T. Orhnial ed. 1982); Easterbrook
& Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985); Halpern. Trebilcock
& Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J.
117 (1980); Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4 J. CORP. L. 351
(1979).
7. See generally C. COOKE, CORPORATION, TRUST AND COMPANY 76-11 (1950); A. DuBois,
THE ENGLISH BUSINESS COMPANY AFTER THE BUBBLE ACT 1720-1800 (1938); L. GOWER, PRINCIPLES
OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 25-41 (4th ed. 1979); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
482-89 (5th ed. 1973); 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 193-222; B. HUNT, supra note 5; 1 F. POLLOCK
& F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY Or ENGLISH LAW 487, 493 (2d ed. 1968); Minchinton, Chartered
Companies and Limited Liability, in LIMITED LIABILITY AND THE CORPORATION 137, 142 (T. Orhnial
ed. 1982); Shannon, The Coming of General Limited Liability, 2 J. EcoN. HIsT. 267 (1932) [hereinafter
cited as Shannon 11; Shannon, The First Five Thousand Limited Companies and Their Duration,
2 J. ECON. HIsT. 396 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Shannon Ill.
8. See W. BUCKLAND, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 54 (F. Lawson ed. 2d ed. 1965)
(English theory of corporations mainly derived from medieval interpretations of Roman law); Carr,
Early Forms of Corporations, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 161 (1909);
Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800 (pt. 2), 2 HAutv. L. REV. 149,
164 (1888) (early English law of corporations borrowed almost entirely from Roman law).
9. There is some question as to the extent that the Romans had accepted the concept of
the corporate personality separate from its shareholders. Those scholars that assert that the concept
of the corporation as a separate legal person was established rely on Ulpian's maxim: Si quid
universitate debetur singuli non debetur; nec quod debet universitas singuli debent. (Where anything
is owing to a corporation, it is not due to the individual members of the same, nor do the latter
owe what the entire association does.) DIG. OF JUST., tit. iv, § 7(i) in 3 S. SCOTT, THE CIVIL LAW
32 (1932). See Perrott, Changes In Attitude to Limited Liability-the European Experience, in LIMITED
LIAmLITY AND THE CORPORATION 81, 85-87 (T. Orhnial ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Perrott].
Others conclude that the concept of the corporation as a juridical person was "foreign to
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the process of completing its slow evolution in the elimination of direct share-
holder liability for corporate obligations.' 0 Holdsworth and Gower conclude that
direct liability, in the absence of charter provision, for shareholders of commercial
corporations had ceased by the end of the sixteenth century.' Other scholars
place the date much later. DuBois, for example, concludes that, limited liability
was of slight importance at this time, and that the relation between incorporation
and limited liability was still equivocal.' 2 The Handlins concur, asserting that
limited liability was still a fuzzy question at the end of the eighteenth century.'"
The evidence from the legal commentary of the time also provides support
for the later date. Hobbes, writing in 1654, referred to the unlimited liability
of members of "a body politic of merchants.' ' 4 Similarly, neither Sir Edward
antiquity" although they recognize that the Romans, as illustrated by the maxim, recognized that
for some purposes the totality of the members of a corporate body had rights and duties different
from those of the individual members. See P. DUFF, PERSONALITY IN ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 35-37
(1938, reprint 1971) (the Ulpian maxim is the "high water mark of Roman thought on legal
personality"); T. HADDEN, R. FORBES & R. SIMMONDS, supra note I, at 9; H. JOLOWIcz, ROMAN
FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN LAW 129-34 (1957); M. KASER, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW § 17, at 77 (R.
Dannenberg trans. 2d ed. 1968).
It is not at all clear whether the Roman law also included limited liability. Numerous scholars
so assert. See, e.g., A. BERLE, JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE 3 (1928); W.
BURDiCx, THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW 274, 291 (1938); A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE
424 (1976); 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 487. Savigny and Williston disagree.
See 2 Savigny, System des heutigen romischen rechts § 92, in W. RATrINGTON, JURAL RELATIONS;
THE ROMAN LAW OF PERSONS AS SUBJECTS OF JURAL RELATIONS: BEING A TRANSLATION OF THE
SECOND BOOK OF SAVIaNY'S SYSTEM OF MODERN ROMAN LAW 220 (1884) (1978 reprint); Williston,
supra note 8, at 160-61. See also Perrott, supra at 85-87. The existence of both direct and indirect
shareholder liability in the very early English law strongly suggests that limited liability was not an
element of the medieval version of the Roman law accepted by the English legal system. See Handlin
& Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, 5 J. EcON. HIST. I, 10 n.52 (1945)
("paucity of material and the uncertainty concerning the general character of Roman corporations
render the drawing of analogies hazardous") [hereinafter cited as Handlin & Handlin, Origins.]
10. Shareholder liability includes direct liability of shareholders for the obligations of the
corporation and indirect liability through the liability of shareholders to the corporation for an
assessment (or in the old English usage, a leviation) to provide the corporation with funds required
for payment of the corporation's obligations.
I1. See 3 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 7, at 484; L. GOWER, supra note 7, at 26. Cf.
Williston, supra note 8, at 161-62 (direct liability continued through the seventeenth century) (citing
Edmunds v. Brown & Tillard, 83 Eng. Rep. 385 (1668); City of London, 86 Eng. Rep. 226 (1680);
Salmon v. Hamborough Co., 22 Eng. Rep. 763 (1671)). The Handlins, however, point out that the
Edmonds case on which Williston relies involved shareholder liability after dissolution, which is a
different issue. See Handlin & Handlin, Origins, supra note 9, at 1, 12 n.53. There is support for
this view that direct liability had come to an end at this time. The charter of the Bank of England
issued in 1694 provided for personal liability of the individual incorporators if the bank borrowed
more than 1,200,000 pounds, clearly implying that there was no direct liability in the absence of
such an express provision in the charter. 5 & 6 W. & M., ch. 20, § 26 (1694). This view is supported
further by a 1692 petition for incorporation of persons seeking to separate the liability of the
corporation from the liability of its members, see 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7. at 203 n.5,
and a 1695 prospectus of promoters of the Million Bank advising that a subscriber was not liable
for the bank's debts beyond the subscriber's stock investment. See Minchinton, supra note 7, at
142.
12. A. DuBols, supra note 7, at 94.
13. Handlin & Handlin, Origins, supra note 9, at 12. See also Minchinton, supra note 7,
at 154 (absence of limited liability in the absence of a charter provision was not clear until well
into the nineteenth century).
14. T. HOBBES. LEVIATHAN 175 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1962).
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Coke, writing in 1612, nor Blackstone, writing in 1765, nor Kyd, writing in
1792, listed limited liability among the essential attributes of the corporation.'"
In the late eighteenth century, the Crown was still following an inconsistent
course. It was issuing some charters that expressly provided for direct shareholder
liability; other charters expressly provided that shareholders were not to be
directly liable.16 Most charters simply were silent, and it had become accepted
increasingly that in the absence of charter provision, shareholders were not
directly liable. 7 Thus, in 1784, the English Attorney General, Lloyd Kenyon
(soon to become Master of the Rolls and the first Baron Kenyon) could advise
confidently in a private opinion that in the event of incorporation, "the Corporate
stock alone would be answerable to the engagements, and the individuals who
may compose the corporation would not be liable in their private characters."'"
Similarly, indirect liability, albeit surviving as a matter of legal principle,
was also coming to an end as a practical matter. The power of the corporation,
resting on charter provision19 or on past practice, to levy assessments on share-
holders, was a remedy creditors could enforce.20 The creditors' remedy, however,
15. 3 E. COKE, FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND OR A COMMENTARY
UPON LITTLETON 6, 412 (1628); 2 E. COKE, supra at 250a. See also Sutton's Hospital, 77 Eng. Rep.
960, 970-71 (1612); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 470 (1st ed. 1765); 2 S. KYD, CORPORATIONS
103 (1793).
16. By the second half of the eighteenth century, limited liability, which had not been
particularly important earlier, was becoming an increasingly important consideration to investors
and promoters. DuBois reports that by this time, persons seeking charters were including limited
liability as a motive for incorporation. See A. DuBois, supra note 7, at 95-97. Six such petitions
were filed from 1768 to 1789. Three acts of incorporation granting charters in the period from
1764 to 1791, in fact, contained express provisions for the limited liability of the members. At the
same time, other charter applications and acts granting charters contained provisions imposing direct
liability on members, but DuBois concludes that such provisions were "clearly considered an exception
to the usual corporation practice." Id. at 97.
17. See supra note 11.
18. Kenyon, Case and Opinion of Jan. 29, 1784, Boulton & Watt MSS., Birmingham
Collection, Assay Office, cited in A. DuBois, supra note 7, at 95-96 n.66. Four years later, having
moved to the bench, Kenyon repeated his opinion in Russell v. Men Dwelling in Devon, 100 Eng.
Rep. 359 (1788), a case that involved a public corporation.
19. The power to levy assessments or leviations upon members beyond the basic investment
appeared prominently in charters. See A. DuBois, supra note 7, at 98-103; 8 W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 7, at 204.
20. In 1671, the House of Lords had approved a remedy in equity that allowed creditors to
compel a corporation to make assessments (or leviations) on its shareholders required for the payment
of corporate debts. Salmon v. Hamborough Co., 22 Eng. Rep. 763 (1671). The creditors had a
judgment against the corporation. The House of Lords held that in the event that the judgment
was not satisfied, the creditors could levy. Id. at 764. A note in a subsequent case states that the
default was not remedied, and the leviations were in fact made. Harvey v. East India Co., 23 Eng.
Rep. 856, 856 (1700). See C. COOKE, supra note 7, at 77; Williston, supra note 8, at 161-62. This
view is held by most scholars. See, e.g., C. COOKE, supra note 7, at 78-79; L. GOWER, supra note
7, at 26; Williston, supra note 8, at 161; Handlin & Handlin, Origins, supra note 9, at 13. Dodd
and Jenkins have a contrary view. Professor Dodd questions the applicability of Salmon in cases
not involving dissolved corporations, in cases not involving an express provision or an accepted
practice of leviations, or the imposition of liability beyond forfeiture of the shares. Compare E.
DooD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, at 85-86, 369 (1954) with 8 W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 7, at 204; C. COOKE, supra note 7, at 77-78; Williston, supra note 8, at 161-62; and
Handlin & Handlin, Origins, supra note 9, at 13. Jenkins confines Salmon to cases of "lifting the
veil" in the presence of fraud. See Jenkins, Skinning the Pantomime Horse: Two Early Cases on
Limited Liability, 34 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 308, 312-21 (1978).
Limited Liability and Corporate Groups
depended on the corporation's power, express or implied, to make assessments;
a levy was feasible if the charter provided for assessments, or at least if the
charter was silent, and permitted an argument based on practice. However, if
the corporate charter expressly limited a corporation's power to assess, the rights
of creditors to impose indirect liability on shareholders through assessments did
not exist. Thus, it comes as no surprise that clauses prohibiting assessments
beyond the basic capital subscription price began to appear in charters and
quickly became "common and efficacious." ' 2' As a result, indirect liability in
England became increasingly less important.
Finally, corporation law on liability played only a minor role in the English
commercial experience because commercial activity was handled increasingly by
joint stock companies, not corporations. Corporate charters had been difficult
and expensive to obtain." For example, during the entire eighteenth century,
the English government had chartered only a half dozen corporations for man-
ufacturing and "hardly more" for other businesses.2" As a result, corporations
were used extensively only for banks, fire and marine insurance, water companies,
and canals.24 The relevant English law in this area, accordingly, is company
law, or the law applicable to joint stock companies, not corporation law.
2. The Predominance of Joint Stock Companies
Growing commercial enterprises increasingly turned to joint stock associations
with transferable shares as an alternative to the corporate form. 2s Such companies
multiplied and became the predominant form for the conduct of business activity.
By 1844, there were almost 1,000 joint stock associations including banks.2"
Some associations had surprisingly widespread ownership of their shares. As
early as 1808, the Birmingham Flour and Bread Company had 8,000 share-
holders.2 7 Originally conceived as a form of partnership, 2 the joint stock as-
sociation developed into an unincorporated association organized under a deed
of settlement, with trustees owning the stock and holding it for the benefit of
the members, 9 who held transferable shares. In an effort to limit member
21. See 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 199-205.
22. See Shannon I, supra note 7, at 267-68 ("a method expensive, cumbersome in procedure
and uncertain of success"); Todd, Some Aspects of Joint Stock Companies, 1844-1900, 4 EcoN.
HIST. REV. 46, 50 n.40 (1932); 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 221.
23. See Handlin & Handlin, Origins, supra note 9, at 3.
• 24. See C. COOKE, supra note 7, at 91; L. GOWER, supra note 7, at 32. Cf. 2 A. SMITH,
AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 756 (1776) (Liberty Classics
ed., R. Campbell, A. Skinner & W. Todd eds. 1976) (Bk. V, pt. III, art. 1).
25. In the wake of the speculative mania leading to the South Sea Bubble collapse, Parliament
enacted the Bubble Act, 6 Geo, 1, ch. 18, § 18 (1719), to prevent the development of joint stock companies
with transferable shares. Wretchedly drafted and virtually "unintelligible," the Act was ineffective.
See Shannon I, supra note 7, at 269. Ultimately, the Act was repealed in 1825. 6 Geo. 4, ch. 91
(1825).
26. See B. HUNT, supra note 5, at 87.
27. See T. HADDEN, COMPANY LAW AND CAPITALISM 17 (2d ed. 1977).
28. See L. GOWER, supra note 7, at 35: 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 208, 213, 215;
Todd, supra note 22, at 49.
29. Members of a joint stock association are partners with partnership liability. They are
also deemed to be shareholders, and alternatively may be called shareholders. To avoid confusion,
they are referred to as members.
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liability arising from the partnership form of the organization, it became common
for the deeds of settlement to include clauses limiting the power of the company
to make calls on members and limiting members' liability to the amount of
their stock interest. These clauses disposed of liability inter se and of indirect
member liability through assessments 0 although they could not terminate liability
of members to third parties.3
Joint stock associations generally attempted to achieve limited liability of
members for debts to third parties through such measures as inserting the term
"limited" after the joint stock company name, including an appropriate legend
on company stationery, and using limitation of liability clauses in their contracts.
Beginning in the early nineteenth century, insurance policies issued by joint stock
insurance companies began to contain clauses limiting liability to company
capital. 32 A few decades later all insurance policies issued by joint stock insurance
companies are reported to have included such clauses." Numerous trading com-
panies followed suit, and similarly, inserted such clauses in their contracts. 4
Although the validity of the contractual limitation as a question of law was
not settled for some time," the commercial practice was unmistakeable. In this
manner, joint stock associations under deeds of settlement attempted to achieve
the advantages of incorporation, without a charter.3 6 Notwithstanding the un-
solved legal questions, joint stock associations flourished, as corporate charters
continued to be difficult and expensive to obtain.3 7 Further, the considerable
practical difficulties of enforcing personal liability under the archaic procedure
of the time tempered the theoretical exposure of members. -
30. Rex v. Dodd, 103 Eng. Rep. 670, 674 (1808) (Ellenborough, L.) (dictum). However, the matter
was not definitively settled until almost 50 years later. In re Athenaeum Life Assurance Soc., 70
Eng. Rep. 216 (1858), 70 Eng. Rep. 347 (1859). Another device to lessen liability as a practicle,
not as a legal, matter was the insertion of a provision in the deed of settlement that required
liquidation of the company while its capital was still sufficient to pay all its debts. See B. HUNT,
supra note 5, at 99.
31. A number of commentators note that cumbersome procedural requirements for suits
against members of joint stock companies in their capacity as partners provided de facto protection
against member liability in widely held companies because of the difficulties of suing and levying
execution on members of a fluctuating group. See L. GOWER, supra note 7, at 36, 40; Diamond,
Corporate Personality and Limited Liability, in LIMITED LIABILITY AND THE CORPORATION 22, 31
(T. Orhnial ed. 1983); Perrott, supra note 9. at 81, 96.
32. See A. DuBots, supra note 7, at 223.
33. See B. HUNT, supra note 5, at 110; Shannon II, supra note 7, at 399 n.3 (suggesting
insurance companies accordingly had little need for limited liability).
34. See C. COOKE, supra note 7, at 282; T. HADDEN, supra note 27, at 11-12; B. HUNT,
supra note 5, at 100.
35. Eventually, a series of cases from 1849 to 1852 upheld as a matter of contract law, the
enforceability of clauses in insurance policies that limited liability under the policy to the capital
of the company. Hassell v. Merchant Traders' Ship, Loan & Ins. Ass'n., 154 Eng. Rep. 1322, 1323
(1850); Hallett v. Dowdall, 118 Eng. Rep. 1, 17-34 (1852); Halkett v. Merchant Traders' Ship Loan
& Ins. Ass'n, 116 Eng. Rep. 1530, 1531 (1849). See In re European Assurance Society (Grains
case), I Ch. D. 307, 322 (1875); C. COOKE, supra, note 7, at 87.
36. Maitland points out that if the state had not finally yielded and made general incorporation
available with limited liability, English commercial activity probably would have been conducted by
joint stock associations contracting wherever possible for limited liability. See 3 F. MAITLAND, TRUSTS
AND CORPORATIONS IN COLLECTED PAPERS 321, 342 (H. Fisher ed. 1911, reissued 1975).
37. See C. COOKE, supra note 7, at 109.
38. See L. GOWER, supra note 7, at 36, 40; T. HADDEN, R. FORBES & R. StoNDs, supra note
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3. The Continuing Political Struggle Over Limited Liability
For three decades after the United States generally had accepted limited
liability, limited liability continued to be a highly controversial political issue in
England,3 9 vigorously debated against a rising tide of industrialization. Widespread
hostility toward limited liability' ° as well as antagonism toward wholesale in-
corporation contended with ever more demanding business pressures for charters
and limited liability. 4' For decades, the outcome of the struggle was uncertain
with each of the contending forces temporarily achieving some success.
In 1844, under Gladstone's leadership, the forces opposing limited liability
temporarily gained the upper hand. The Joint Stock Companies Registration,.
Incorporation, and Regulation Act, 18442 which permitted general incorpora-
tion,413 imposed unlimited liability on members for unsatisfied corporate judg-
ments." Members that made payments to company creditors had the right to
contribution from their fellow members. 4 The 1844 Act also prohibited charter
provisions that limited liability, but was silent with respect to like provisions in
contracts with third parties.
Although Hunt reports that from 1844 to 1856 almost 1;000 unlimited
companies registered under the 1844 Act 4 6 it proved unworkable. It failed to
solve the problem of evasion through transfer of shares. The 1844 Act was also
perceived as having retarded investment by more wealthy investors because of
their concern that creditors would first proceed against them in preference to
less wealthy members.4 7
1, at 13-15. Cf. Van Sandau v. Moore, 38 Eng. Rep. 171 (1826) (300 parties in litigation for
decades), cited in T. HADDEN, R. FORBES & R. SIMMONDS, supra note 1, at 13. This de facto
limitation on liability led to much improved collection precedures involving a court appointed master
to oversee liquidation and the collection from shareholders in The Joint Stock Companies Winding
Up Act, 1848, 11 & 12 Vict., ch. 45. See Amsler, Bartlett & Bolton, Thoughts of Some British
Economists on Early Limited Liability and Corporate Legislation, 13 HiST. POL. EcoN. 774, 779
(1981).
39. See generally C. COOKE, supra note 7; L. GOWER, supra note 7; T. HADDEN, supra note
27; B. HUNT, supra note 5; Perrott, supra note 9; Shannon I, supra note 7; Shannon II, supra
note 7; Todd, supra note 22.
40. See Shannon I, supra note 7, at 269. Such hostility was reflected in a flurry of prosecutions
under the Bubble Act, 6 Geo. 1, ch. 18, § 18 (1719), from 1807 to 1811, and again in 1821. See B. HtNr,
supra note 5, at 17-21. E.g., Rex v. Dodd, 103 Eng. Rep. 670 (1808); Rex v. Buck, 170 Eng. Rep.
1052 (1808); Rex v. Stratton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1053 (1808); Rex v. Webb, 104 Eng. Rep. 658 (1811);
Josephs v. Pebrer, 107 Eng. Rep. 870 (1825).
41. For example, during the boom of 1824, there were as many as 250 private bills pending
in Parliament providing for charters or privileges of some kind. See B. HUNT, supra note 5, at
32.
42. 7 & 8 Vict., ch. 110 (1844).
43. The 1844 Act has been hailed as the first general incorporation statute. See Perrott,
supra note 9. at 100. However, New York had the distinction of enacting the first general incorporation
statute. Act of Mar. 22, 1811, ch. 67, N.Y. Laws I1. See infra note 133.
44. Creditors were required to first pursue their remedies against the corporation. See L.
GOWER, supra note 7, at 41.
45. 7 & 8 Vict., ch. 110, § 67 (1844). The Act also provided for contribution from the
company, and the member was entitled to proceed against other members only after "due diligence"
to obtain satisfaction from the company. Id. § 66.
46. See B. HUNT, supra, note 5, at 114.
47. See T. HADOEN, supro note 27, at 16.
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Accordingly, the 1844 Act did not finally dispose of limited liability as a
political issue, and the political struggle continued unabated. 48 On one hand,
limited liability was urged as essential for accumulation of the substantial capital
investment required by the growing industrial order. On the other hand, limited
liability was criticized as speculative and fraudulent, and thus would lead to
uneconomic promotions.4 9
The Depression of 1845-1848 and public acceptance of limited liability for
railways helped tilt the balance toward limited liability.50 The railways were
among the most successful of the growing English industries.-" They resembled
the large modern business enterprises that were to follow. Their need for heavy
capital investment led to an increasingly larger number of shareholders and
widespread distribution of the shares. In turn, the distribution of shares led to
the development of active security markets throughout England.s " The distribution
of shares also inevitably resulted in less participation by members in the man-
agement of the enterprise and the separation of investors from managers. Finally,
the railways' exposure to heavy tort liability could not be eliminated by contractual
limitations and public notice. In light of these facts, few questioned the
validity of limited liability for railways." Acceptance of limited liability for the
railways foreshadowed the ultimate acceptance of limited liability generally.
4
Finally, Parliament enacted the Limited Liability Act, 1855"1 and the Joint
Stock Companies Act, 1856.16 These statutes authorized general limited liability
and thus ended the debate. They provided for registration of all existing un-
incorporated joint stock associations, registration of new companies, and limited
liability for the members of all registering companies." Although the 1855 and
1856 Acts excluded banks and insurance companies, banks were later included
in 1857 and 18581s and insurance companies in 1862. . 9 The Companies Act,
48. It is not without interest that the economists of the time were divided on the issue. See
Amsler, Bartlett & Bolton, supra note 38, at 779-92; Ekelund & Tollison, Mercantilist Origins of
the Corporation, II BELL J. EcON. 715, 729 n.7 (1980).
Thorstein Veblen suggests a different explanation than political or economic forces for the
reluctance of the English to accept limited liability. He suggests that such reluctance was rooted in
philosophical considerations, and that it flowed from attachment to the principles of "natural liberty"
and "free contract." Liability was viewed as a personal attribute of the member of the enterprise
from which a person was not competent to divest himself. See T. VEBLEN, THEORY OF BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE 280 n.1 (1904, reissued 1973).
49. See Shannon I, supra note 7, at 284-85.
50. See L. GOWER, supra note 7, at 43; Perrott, supra note 9, at 100.
51. See B. HUNT, supra note 5, at 102.
52:.. See B. HUNT, supra note 5, at 105-12.
53. Hunt, however, notes that the speculation in railway shares in the 1840's led to some
Eriticism of limited liability for railways as well. Id. at 126 n.65.
"54. See Shannon I. supra note 7, at 286-87; Hicks, Limited Liability: The Pros and the
Cons, in LIMiTED LIABILITY AND THE CORPORATION 11, 12 (T. Orhnial ed. 1982).
55. 18 & 19 Vict., ch. 133 (1855).
56. i9 & 20 Vict., ch. 47 (1856).
57. Id. § 3. See Todd, supra note 22.
58. Joint Stock Banking Companies Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict., ch. 49 (providing registration
for banks); The Joint Stock Banking Companies Limited Liability Act, 1858, 21 & 22 Vict., ch.
91 (providing limited liability for banks). See C. COOKE, supra note 7, at 163-68.
59. The Companies Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., ch. 89.
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186211 generally restated the earlier statutes and lasted as the basic statute until
The Companies Act of 1908.61
Thus, after decades of dispute, general incorporation and limited liability
were definitively accepted in the English law. Laissez-faire had triumphed.62 The
process had been far from inevitable, and adoption came only after a long
struggle.
4. Summary
Several important aspects in the English experience should be noted. First,
the ultimate triumph of limited liability did not come until more than one
hundred years after the onset of the Industrial Revolution and decades after
limited liability had become common in the United States. Second, unlike its
United States counterpart, the modern English business company evolved from
the joint stock association organized under a deed of settlement, rather than
from a grant of incorporation from the state; it thus owes more to partnership
principles than to a rule based on corporate personality. 3 Finally, the English
experience leaves no doubt that the extension of limited liability reflected a
deliberate political decision in the face of commercial pressures to achieve
economic objectives, rather than an inevitable conceptual derivation from the
separate nature of the entity.
Limited liability was not an essential component of the English legal system
under which the first one hundred years of the Industrial Revolution flourished.
Nor was it an inevitable component of the capitalist economic system. English
industrial activity increased enormously under a legal rule imposing liability on
shareholders.
Scholars disagree on the impact of the absence of limited liability on the
growth of the English economy during the first half of the 19th century. Cooke
discusses assertions that the unavailability of limited liability in England during
this period discouraged investment in England and led to heavy investment by
English investors in South American government loans.6 He criticizes this view,
suggesting that the higher rate of return available on foreign government loans
was a more likely explanation. He emphasizes that the investing public showed
no sign of hesitating to support enterprises conducted by unincorporated joint
stock companies. Maitland also discounted the significance of unlimited liability.
6 -
On the other hand, there was a "very striking" increase in the number of
companies registered following the adoption of limited liability.6 During the
seven years following the adoption of limited liability (1855-1862), 2,479 com-
panies registered under the 1855 Act compared with only 956 companies com-
60. Id.
61. The Companies Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, ch. 69.
62. See L. GowER, supra note 7, at 47-48; B. HUNT. supra note 5, at 158-59.
63. See Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69 HARV..
L. REv. 1369, 1371-72 (1956).
64. See C. COOKE, supra note 7, at 102-03.
65. See 3 F. MrrLAND, supra note 36, at 342. o
66. Todd, supra note 22, at 62-64. Todd attributes the increase in part to limited liability
but also to rising trade prosperity. Id. at 64 n.l. He also points out that many of the new companies
were formed for speculating purposes and never came into operation. Id. at 69.
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pleting registration in the previous eleven years during which the 1844 Act with
unlimited liability had been effective. 6 This appears to demonstrate the signif-
icance of limited liability as an incentive to commercial activity. 68 Further, despite
the efforts of the lawyers to achieve limited liability as a matter of contract
for joint stock association members through clauses in the deeds of settlement,
contractual provisions, and notice to the public, the fact remains that limited
liability as a matter of statute was widely perceived by business interests as
highly desirable, and commercial pressures for statutory limited liability had
continued. As long as statutory liability was perceived to be important but was
unavailable, there must have been some significant deterrence to investment.
Other fundamental factors appear to have been the increasing distribution
of share ownership and the declining role of shareholder participation in man-
agement. Enterprises were becoming increasingly larger. As the number of share-
holders substantially increased, shareholders became less involved in the conduct
of the enterprise and became solely investors. This process had started as early
as the seventeenth century with the development of free assignability of shares
of joint stock associations, a process that the Bubble Act 69 had been unable to
bring to an end. Professor Hadden reports that "by the middle of the seventeenth
century the ownership of a share had clearly come to be regarded as a matter
of financial rather than personal participation. ' 70 By the end of the seventeenth
century, there was a flourishing public market both in London and in the
provinces for the shares of all the major English companies."' An indication of
the level of trading activity is provided by the fact that in 1697, the Parliament
passed a statute regulating the licensing of brokers. 72 Professor Perrott adds
that in the eighteenth century, free transferability of shares was more important
than limited liability. 73 Under these circumstances, the lack of utility and fairness
in imposing liability on investors for the acts of the managers became recognized
increasingly. 74
The adoption of the 1862 Act7 ushered in a period of speculation and
security frauds 76 that ultimately led to what has been described as the most
severe panic in the history of the London financial community. 7 Thus, Anthony
Trollope (1815-1882), that perceptive observer of the English scene, described
the speculative fever as "dishonesty magnificent in its proportions, and climbing
into high places."' 8 Although the adoption of limited liability had contributed
to the very excesses which its opponents had warned, there was no repudiation
67. See Shannon I, supra note 7, at 290.
68. Compare the English experience with the different experience in Massachuseus. See infra
text accompanying note 139.
69. 6 Geo. 1, ch. 18, § 18 (1719). See supra note 25.
70. See T. HADDEN, supra note 27, at 12 (emphasis added).
71. See B. HUNT, supra note 5, at 105-12.
72. 8 & 9 Will. 3, ch. 32 (1697). See T. HADDEN, R. FORBES & R. SIMMONDS, supra note
I, at 11-12.
73. See Perrott, supra note 9, at 98-102.
74. See C. COOKE, supra note 7, at 111.
75. The Limited Liability Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., ch. 96.
76. See Levi, 33 .IoSTAT. Soc. (London) 1 (1870) (extent of frauds and panicked speculation),
cited in Amsler, Bartlett & Bolton, supra note 38, at 789.
77. See B. HUNT, supra note 5, at 153-55.
78. See A. TROLLOPE, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 294-95 (1883, reissued 1947).
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of limited liability. Once adopted, limited liability became a settled principle of
English company law.
B. The Emergence of Limited Liability in American Law (1830) 9
Until 1776, the English experience provided the American colonies with an
embryonic legal framework for business.8 0 Following the American Revolution,
however, the new American nation departed from its English legal inheritance
that had rested in part on the corporation, primarily municipal and governmental
rather than commercial, and in part on the unincorporated joint stock association.
In England, Parliament's reluctance to grant corporate charters led to the
emergence of the joint stock association as the common form for the conduct
of business. The United States, however, followed a different route. Following
the Revolution, the incorporating power moved to the thirteen states. The state
legislatures did not share the English Parliamentary reluctance to grant corporate
charters, and the special acts of incorporation were granted much more readily
than in England. As a result, more than 300 American business corporations
were formed between 1783 and 1801.111 Thus, in the new American nation, the
corporation, not the joint stock association, became the predominant form. 82
In this early stage, American corporate charters were granted readily, first
for corporations with public functions such as bridges, canals, turnpikes, and
subsequently, for financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies.
Charters for manufacturing companies were another matter. Few manufacturing
charters were granted in the first thirty years of the new nation. As relations
79. See generally 2 J. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS,
No. 4, EIGHTEENTH CENTURY BUSlNESS CORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1917, reissued 1965);
E. DODD, supra note 20; 0. HANDUIN & M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETrS, 1774-1861 (rev. ed. 1969) (hereinafter
cited as 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH]; J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 (1970); S. LIVERMORE, EARLY AMERICAN
LAND COMPANIES (1939, reissued 1968) [hereinafter cited as S. LIVERMORE, LAND COMPANIES); Dodd,
The Evolution of Limited Liability in American Industry, Massachusetts, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1351
(1948); Handlin & Handlin, Origins, supra note 9; Livermore, Unlimited Liability in Early American
Corporations, 43 J. POL. ECON. 674 (1935) (hereinafter cited as Livermore, Corporations).
For histories of the development in Connecticut and Maryland respectively, see E. GRANT,
YANKEE DREAMERS & DOERS (1973); Blandi, Maryland Business Corporations 1783-1852, 52 JOHNS
HOPKINS U. STUD. His'r. & POL. SCI. 301 (1934).
80. GOWER, supra note 63, at 1370.
81. See 2 J. DAVIS, supra note 79, at 27; E. DODD, supra note 20, at 11; Handlin & Handlin,
Origins, supra note 9, at 4; J. HUtST, supra note 79, at 14.
82. See E. DODD, supra note 20, at 367; J. HURST, supra note 79, at 8. Baldwin and the
Handlins suggest that although the Bubble Act had some deterrent influence, it was not significant.
Its influence ended with the Revolution, before the growth of the factory system and the movement
for business charters. See Handlin & Hapidlin, Origins, supra note 9, at 5; Baldwin, History of the
Law of Private Corporations in the Colonies and States, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY 236, 249 (1909).
The unincorporated joint stock association, then so prominent in the English commercial world,
was not unknown in the new American nation, but it was much less important, except in the special
case of land companies. See E. DODD, supra note 20, at 367; S. LIVERMORE, LAND COMPANIES,
supra note 79, at 9-36; Gower, supra note 63, at 1372; Livermore, Corporations, supra note 79,
at 674-75 n.2, 676. Davis reports only one incorporated land company. He suggests that a possible
explanation is the absence of a widespread distribution of members. See 2 J. DAVIS, supra note
79, at 289.
1986]
The Journal of Corporation Law
with England deteriorated during the early nineteenth century, American readiness
to depend on European manufactured goods disappeared, and manufacturing
became an increasingly important political weapon, particularly in New England.
The early reluctance to issue manufacturing charters changed; thus from 1808-
1815, 128 manufacturing corporations were formed in Massachusetts alone."
1. Direct Shareholder Liability
As the corporate form became available more readily, businessmen used it
increasingly, primarily to achieve perpetuity of existence and ready transferability
of shares.M Except for financial enterprises such as banks and insurance com-
panies, limited liability was still of slight importance. 5 It was almost unknown
in Massachusetts where the Handlins report that during the first thirty years of
its existence not a single act of incorporation or petition for incorporation even
mentioned limited liability. 86 On the other hand, in New York, there were at
least three early instances of limited liability,' and in Maryland, the applicants
for a manufacturing charter in 1789 sought limited liability.""
By the start of the nineteenth century, direct shareholder liability was still
common. In Massachusetts, about half of the early charters imposed full direct
liability on shareholders for corporate debts; the others were silent. None provided
for limited liability.8 9 In Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont, as well
as Massachusetts, numerous charters of this early period also provided for direct
liability of shareholders.90 Similarly, New York charters for manufacturing busi-
nesses, with rare exceptions, provided for direct shareholder liability. New York
83. See 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH, supra note 79, at 107-21, 127; Baldwin,
supra note 82, at 236, 250.
84. For the primacy of the factors of free assignability and duration of existence, rather
than limited liability, as incentives for incorporation, see J. HURST, supra note 79, at 9, 28; S.
LIVERMORE, LAND COMPANIES, supra note 79, at 236, 254; Ekelund & Tollison, supra note 48, at
720; Livermore, Corporations, supra note 79, at 676. Clark asserts that the principal advantage
was seen as the ability to sue and collect debts. I V. CLARK, HISTORY OF MANUFACTURERS IN THE
UNITED STATES 1607-1860, at 456 (1929). The English experience was similar. Perrott, supra note
9, at 98-102.
85. See J. HuRsT, supra note 79, at 9; S. LIVERMORE, LAND COMPANIES, supra note 79, at
236, 254; Livermore, Corporations, supra note 79, at 676. Davis, however, is alone in asserting
that limited liability was "a principal object desired through incorporation." 2 J. DAVIS, supra note
79, at 317. Livermore explains that this comment applies only to banks and insurance companies.
S. LIVERMORE, LAND COMPANIES, supra note 79, at 236 n.50.
86. See Handlin & Handlin, Origins, supra note 9, at 10.
87. In 1789, The Bank of New York was organized in New York with limited liability.
Similarly, in 1786, a New York joint stock association, The Associated Iron Manufacturing Company
of the City and County of New York, received a charter with seven years duration that provided
for limited liability. See 2 J. DAVIS, supra note 79, at 260; S. LIVERMORE, LAND COMPANIES, supra
note 79, at 269. The Hamilton Manufacturing Society (Albany Glass Works) also received a charter
providing for limited liability. See id. at 269-70.
88. The 1789 charter application of the Baltimore Manufacturing Company sought limited
liability. See 2 J. DAVIS, supra note 79, at 267-68; Blandi, supra note 79, at 28.
89. See E. DODD, supra note 20, at 227, 373; Livermore, Corporations, supra note 79, at
677-78.
90. See E. DODD, supra note 20, at 398, 409, 412, 419; S. LIVERMORE, LAND COMPANIES,
supra note 79, at 264-67; Livermore, Corporations, supra note 79, at 679-81.
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charters for other industries were quite different.9 ' Early bank charters, including
the Bank of New York, provided for limited liability. Corporate charters for
companies with public functions, such as canal, bridge, water, and turnpike
companies, similarly provided for limited liability, while insurance and bank
charters typically provided for double liability.92 The Maryland experience was
somewhat different. The State of Maryland itself invested in some new cor-
porations, particularly banks, and this investment made the imposition of liability
on shareholders more difficult. Of the early manufacturing charters, only three
(issued between 1823 and 1825) provided for full direct liability and only two
(issued in 1822) for double liability. 3
2. Indirect Shareholder Liability
Indirect shareholder liability through assessments was also a reality and
assessments were common.94 In the early stages of corporate development, cor-
porations could make assessments without limit; the Middlesex Canal Company,
for example, had 100 assessments. 9 Charters typically provided for wide powers
to levy assessments and thus for indirect shareholder liability.96 Some charters
were silent, but even in these cases the corporations made assessments. 9' It was
soon held, however, that no assessment could be made unless authorized by
charter, contract, or statute.98
Although the corporate power to levy assessments remained unquestioned,
there was some uncertainty as to the American remedies available to creditors.
As previously noted, in the view of most scholars, the House of Lords in the
Salmon case had fashioned an English remedy in equity under which creditors
could compel a corporation in default to levy the assessment necessary for the
payment of the judgment debt.99 In South Carolina, Hume v. Winyaw & Wando
91. See E. DODD, supra note 20, at 365; Livermore, Corporations, supra note 79, at 683-
84. But see 2 J. DAVIS, supra note 79, at 279.
92. See Livermore, Corporations, supra note 79, at 683-84.
93. Blandi, supra note 79, at 18, 44-45, 51 (Maryland invested in shares of ten banks as
early as 1816).
94. Professor Dodd cautions against confusing assessments for the unpaid portion of the
stock subscription with assessments for capital contributions in addition to the full issuance price
for the shares. See E. DODD, supra note 20, at 74. This warning is particularly important because
of the practice at that time of requiring payment at the outset of only a small portion of the
purchase price of the shares.
95. See id. at 13, citing C. ROBERTS, MIDDLESEX CANAL, 1793-1860 (1938); 0. HANDLIN &
M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH, supra note 79, at 141. It must be recognized, however, that share-
holders had the right to avoid assessments by forfeiting their stock. Middlesex Turnpike Co. v.
Swan, 10 Mass. 384, 387 (1813).
96. See 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH, supra note 79, 15 108, 124, 144-45.
97. See Handlin & Handlin, Origins, supra note 9, at 14. This occurred in England as well.
See A. DuBois, supra note 7, at 102.
98. Franklin Glass Co. v. White, 14 Mass. 286, 288 (1817); Commonwealth v. Blue-Hill
Turnpike Corp., 5 Mass. 420, 422 (1809); Tippetts v. Walker, 4 Mass. 596, 597 (1808). See J.
ANGELL & S. AMES, TREATIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE § 544 (9th ed.
1871).
99. Salmon v. Hamborough Co., 22 Eng. Rep. 763 (1671). See supra note 20.
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Canal Company'" followed Salmon and upheld the right of creditors in equity
to compel corporate assessments on shareholders for their benefit.' 0' Similarly
at this time, several New York cases, in dicta,""2 and a Georgia case'0 3 upheld
the right of creditors to enforce shareholders' obligations to the corporation in
equity. In Massachusetts, however, the legislature had failed to create a court
of equity; and an equitable remedy was unavailable." 4
3. The Growth of Manufacturing Corporations
Statutory development in the Northeastern states was strongly influenced
by the rapidly growing industrialization that followed the introduction of the
power loom, the growth of the factory system, and the elimination of manu-
factured imports by the Embargo Act of 1807 and the Non-Intercourse Act of
1809.10s By 1810, for example, the Connecticut legislature was flooded with
requests by manufacturers for charters."' 6 this "intensive and rapid development""' 7
was accelerated by the War of 1812 and encouraged by the Tariff Act of 1816.1'"
Under the explosive influence of the new mechanical technology and the factory
system, the New England textile industry grew at a remarkable rate. In comparison
to only seven Arkwright mills in the United States in 1800, there were 100,000
textile workers in New England by 1815.0 9 The number of spindles increased
from 8,000 in 1807, to 191,000 in 1820, to 1,250,000 in 1831; the factory
consumption of wool soared from 400,000 pounds in 1810 to 15,000,000 pounds
in 1830." 0 This growth made for attractive investment opportunities, and business
promoters eagerly sought manufacturing charters, preferably with limited liability,
but charters in any event.
100. I CAROLINA L. J. 217 (1830). The assessments were pursuant to a resolution of the
members "having the effect and operation of a bye-law [sic]" which the court held "obligatory"
on all members. Id. at 228. In the Hume case, the assessments on shareholders are reported to
have gone beyond "the amount of their capital stock." See Hightower v. Thornton, 8 Ga. 486,
493, 499 (1850).
101. Id. at 225.
102. Briggs v. Penniman, 8 Cow. 386, 395-96 (N.Y. 1826); Slee v. Bloom, 19 Johns. 456,
483-84 (N.Y. 1822). See E. DODD, supra note 20, at 64, 88.
103. Hightower v. Thorton, 8 Ga. 486 (1850). See Briggs v. Penniman, 8 Cow. 386 (N.Y.
1826); Slee v. Bloom, 19 Johns. 456 (N.Y. 1822). See also E. DODD, supra note 20, at 64, 88.
104. In the Blue-Hill Turnpike case, Chief Justice Parsons deplored the court's inability to
grant relief for this reason. Commonwealth v. Blue-Hill Turnpike Corp., 5 Mass. 420, 426 (1809).
105. See I V. C.ARK, supra note 84, at 266-67.
Prior to the Revolution, colonial industrial development had been hampered by English re-
strictions. England had prohibited the export of machinery to the Colonies. 23 Geo. 2, ch. 24
(1756); 14 Geo. 3, ch 71 (1774). It had also banned the emigration of mechanics. See E. GRANT,
supra note 79, at 6. Professor Bruchey asserts, however, that the relatively undeveloped nature of
the economy, rather than British opposition, explains the paucity of business coporations in the
colonial periods. See S. BRUCHEY, THE RooTs OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH 1607-1861. at 71
(1965, reprinted 1968).
106. See E. GRANT, supra note 79, at 114.
107. See W. SMITH & A. COLE, FLUCtUATIONS IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 1790-1860, at 5 (1969).
108. 3 Stat. ch. 107 (1816). The Act imposed a 25 percent tariff on cotton and wool imports.
See I V. CLARK, supra note 84, at 266-67; E. GRANT, supra note 79, at 115.
109. See 2 J. Bisnop, HISTORY OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURES FROM 1608 TO 1860, at 213-14
(3d ed. 1868); E. DODD, supra note 20, at 368.
110. See S. BRUCHEY, supra note 105, at 87-90.
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When first faced with increased demand for manufacturing company charters,
the legislatures that had already approved the use of the corporate form for
public purposes were reluctant to grant charters for manufacturing. As business
pressure increased, the New England states eventually yielded and granted charters
for manufacturing, but not with limited liability. In Massachusetts, for example,
the 1809"' and 1822112 statutes imposed direct liability on shareholders of man-
ufacturing companies, while New York charters for public function companies
typically provided for limited liability and bank and insurance company charters
typically provided only for double liability.
The growth of the manufacturing corporation reflects the rapid growth of
New England industry. For example, in the twenty years before 1809, Massa-
chusetts, the most industrialized state, granted only ten charters. Eleven charters
were granted in 1809 alone, and by 1815, 115 textile companies had obtained
charters in addition to numerous other manufacturing corporations. From 1808
to 1815, New York issued 165 manufacturing company charters.11' In 1823, eight
states had a total of 557 manufacturing corporations; New York with 203 and
Massachusetts with 161 were the leaders." 4 By 1830, the United States as a
whole had nearly 1,900 corporations, including 600 in manufacturing and mining.' 5
The increase in the number of corporations did not occur without arousing
considerable hostility. In 1821, for example, the New York constitutional con-
vention amended the New York Constitution to require approval of corporate
charters by a two-thirds vote in each house of the legislature." 6
4. The Shift to Limited Liability
a. Judicial Development
A cardinal legal question at the beginning of the nineteenth century was
whether shareholders were directly liable for corporate debts if the charter was
silent on shareholder liability. No answer is available. Professor Dodd states
that eighteenth century thought in the United States on this question was "almost
non-existent,"" 7 the Handlins note that it was really just a hypothetical question
at this time,"' and Davis reports that he was unable to find a single creditor
III. Act of March 3, 1809, ch. 65, § 6, 1806-1809 Mass. Laws 464, 466.
112. Act of Jan. 28, 1822, ch. 38, 1818-1822 Mass. Laws 619.
113. See S. BRUCHEY, supra note 105, at 130.
114. See I V. CLARK, supra note 84, at 266-67.
115. See E. DODD, supra note 20, at 11,368. The growth in states, other than New York
and Massachusetts, was much slower. Thus, from 1800 to 1820, Maryland issued only 17 manu-
facturing charters, New Jersey 12, and Ohio 3. G. EVANS, BUSINESS INCoRPoRATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 1800-1943 (1948); Blandi, supra note 79, at 14. Pennsylvania issued only 15 manufacturing
charters by 1820. See Miller, A Note on the History of Business Corporations in Pennsylvania,
1800-1860, 55 Q. J. ECON. 150, 156-57 (1940). Connecticut was more active with 38 manufacturing
company charters by 1820. See E. GRANT, supra note 79, at 85.
116. See 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 272 (13th ed. 1884) (change intended
"to check the improvident increase").
Clark reports that in 1826 mechanics in Philadelphia protested against the grant of incorporation
to Vulcan Iron Works. The corporation was seen as a vehicle to permit the enrighment of investors
"without risk of their private fortunes." I V. CLARK, supra note 84, at 281-82.
117. See E. DODD, supra note 20, at 120.
118. Handlin & Handlin, Origins, supra note 9, at 16-17.
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loss from a business failure in the twenty years after the Revolution."1 9 This
situation changed in the opening decades of the nineteenth century a period
with numerous reports of business failures. 2 0
This fundamental issue was soon resolved in the first quarter of the nineteenth
century. Both the Massachusetts courts12' and Justice Story sitting as a federal
circuit court Judge in Wood v. Dummer'2 held that shareholders were not
directly liable for corporate debts unless the statute or charter expressly so
provided. The courts pointed to the numerous charters of the time that imposed
direct liability as confirmation that, in the absence of such a provision, share-
holders were not directly liable. Similarly, in 1816, Chief Justice Tilghman of
Pennsylvania stated that shareholders were not personally liable.123 The absence
of direct shareholder liability if not expressly imposed by statute or charter
imperceptibly became accepted law. Thus, both Dane writing in 1824, and Angell
and Ames writing in 1832, took the absence of direct shareholder liability in
such circumstances for granted.'2
At the same time, the Massachusetts courts, influenced by the wording of
the Massachusetts statutes, concluded that in the absence of express charter
provision, there was no indirect liability via assessments as well. 25 Connecticut
similarly held that in the absence of express or implied authorization for as-
sessments in the charter, there was no inherent power to assess.'2 6 More than
a decade later, however, South Carolina was still upholding indirect shareholder
liability through assessments. 27
b. Legislative Development
As industry continued its rapid growth, industrialists, whose political in-
fluence increased as their economic power grew, pressed for the extension to
119. See 2 J. DAVIS, supra note 79, at 294.
120. Clark reports that in the depressed period of 1816, every textile mill in New England
shut down. See I V. CLARK, supra note 84, at 378. Many bank failures had occurred in Maryland
by 1818. See Blandi, supra note 79, at 43. Grant similarly reports that with the wave of manufacturing
enterprises, the percentage of failures in Connecticut became high, including one occasion where a
Connecticut manufacturer was jailed for debt in 1822. See E. GRANT, supra note 79, at 114.
121. Nichols v. Thomas, 4 Mass. 232, 233-35 (1808); Spear v. Grant, 16 Mass. 9, 12 (1819).
Cf. Tippetts v. Walker, 4 Mass. 595, 597 (1808).
122. 30 F. Cas. 435, 436 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944) ("The individual stockholders are
not liable for the debts of the banks in their private capacities. The charter releves them from
personal responsibility, and substitutes the capital stock in its stead.") (Story, J.).
123. See Myers v. Irwin, 2 Serg. & Rawle 368, 371 (Pa. 1816) ("personal responsibility of a
stockholder is inconsistent with the nature of a body corporate").
124. J. ANGELL & S. AMES, supra note 98, at 349. See 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, COM-
MONWEALTH, supra note 79, at 147, citing N. DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF
AMERICAN LAW 472 (1824).
125. Franklin Glass Co. v. White, 14 Mass. 286, 288-89 (1817); Andover & Medford Turnpike
Corp. v. Gould, 6 Mass. 39, 42-45 (1809). See 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH, supra
note 79, at 158; Dodd, Book Review, 61 HARV. L. REV. 555, 558-59 (1948). The courts were
influenced by the statutory provision that shares were to be forfeited in the event of a failure to
pay an assessment and construed this to be the exclusive remedy. See E. DODD, supra note 20, at
88-90; 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH, supra note 79, at 141-42.
126. Marlborough Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 2 Conn. 579, 583-84 (1818). Influenced by the Mas-
sachusetts and Connecticut decisions, Livermore contends that the interest of historians in assessments
represents only historical hindsight. S. LIVERMORE, LAND COMPANIES, supra note 79, at 280. This
argument, however, goes too far.
127. Hume v. Winyaw & Wando Canal Co., I CAROLINA L.J. 217 (1830).
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manufacturing companies of the limitations on shareholder liability that already
had been accepted for companies with public function or financial objectives.
These efforts gradually met with success, and states began to enact statutes that
provided limited liability for manufacturing companies.
New Hampshire' in 1816, and Connecticut' 29 in 1818, adopted limited
liability for manufacturing companies. Maine'30 followed suit in 1823. The stage
then moved to Massachusetts where businessmen and political figures argued
that these other New England states were attracting capital investment as a result
of their more liberal statutes.' 3' The depression of 1829 gave further impetus
to the business campaign. In 1830, Massachusetts adopted a statute that provided
limited liability. 3 2 Although special incorporation was still required, it was freely
granted.
New York in 1811,1 33 and New Jersey in 1816,131 adopted statutes for the
incorporation of manufacturing companies that provided for double liability;
ultimately, these statutes were replaced by limited liability statutes. Rhode Island,
second only to Massachusetts with respect to industrialization, was the last New
England state to yield. Limited liability for Rhode Island manufacturing com-
panies was not enacted until 1847.1 5
The Pennsylvania experience was unique. Pennsylvania was reluctant to
grant any charters to manufacturing companies. When rare Pennsylvania charters
128. Professor Dodd reports that New Hampshire accepted limited liability in substantially all
charters granted after 1816 although a general limited liability statute was not enacted until 1837.
Act of July 6, 1837, ch. 322, § 14, 1835-1839 N.H. Laws 297, 299. The act was similar to the
Massachusetts 1830 statute. See E. Dow), supra note 20, at 396-99; Dodd, supra note 79, at 1375-
76.
New Hampshire reverted briefly to unlimited liability from 1842 to 1846 before finally embracing
limited liability. See Act of June 24, 1842, ch. 1, § 12, 1842 N.H. Laws 605, 607, E. DODD,
supra note 20, at 404.
129. Act of May Session, 1818, ch. 8, 1818 Conn. Pub. Acts 305.
130. Act of Feb. 5, 1823, ch. 221, § 1, 1823 Me. Laws 929.
131. See E. DODD, supra note 20, at 378-81; Livermore, Corporations, supra note 79, at 677.
Two scholars of the period report that a contemporary article complained that the rule of unlimited
liability was driving "millions of capital into the neighboring states for investment." See J. ANGELL
& S. AMES, supra note 98, at 362, referring to 4 Am. Jurist 307. Similar assertions were made in
Maryland. See Blandi, supra note 79, at 55.
132. Act of Feb. 23, 1830, ch. 53, § 8, 1830 Mass. Acts 325, 329.
133. Act of Mar. 22, 1811, ch. 67, § 7, 1811 N.Y. Laws Ill, 113. The statute provided for
shareholder liability "to the extent of their respective shares and no further." Id. This language
might have been construed to provide for pro rata liability. The California and Georgia courts, as
well as Livermore, so misread the statute. See Larrabee v. Baldwin, 35 Cal. 155, 161 (1868); Branch
v. Baker, 53 Ga. 502 (1874); Lane v. Harris, 16 Ga. 217 (1854); S. LIvERMORE, LAND COMPANtES,
supra note 79, at 261. The New York courts, however, construed the statute as providing for double
liability. See Slee v. Bloom, 19 Johns. 456, 483-85 (N.Y. 1822); Briggs v. Penniman, 8 Cow. 387,
396 (N.Y. 1826); Howard, Stockholders' Liability under the New York Act of March 22, 1811, 46
J. PoL. EcoN. 499 (1938).
The 1811 Act was the world's first general incorporation statute, although general incorporation
statutes in the United States generally were not enacted until decades later. See Dix, Adequate Risk
Capital: The Consideration for the Benefits of Separate Incorporation, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 478, 479
(1958). England in 1844 and France in 1867 enacted general incorporation statutes on a national
level.
134. 40th Gen. Assembly, 2d sitting, 1816 N.J. Laws 77.
135. Act of June Session 1847, R.I. Acts & Resolves 30.
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were issued, 3 6 they typically were silent on limited liability. With the change in
judicial attitudes, incorporation came to mean limited liability. Limited liability
became the rule in Canada in 1850, long after its general acceptance in the
United States, but still a few years ahead of its acceptance in England.'"
Notwithstanding general acceptance of limited liability in the United States,
most states imposed some form of qualified personal liability upon shareholders;
these survivals, which continued well into the twentieth century, are reviewed
later in this Article. This survival was not an insignificant matter. Thus, Chan-
cellor Kent lamented: "The tendency of legislatures and of judicial decisions is
to increase the personal liability of stockholders . . . and to give [corporations)
more and more the characteristics of partnerships with some of the powers and
privileges of corporations."' 38
5. The Significance of Competing Legal Rules on Economic Development
Thus, for several decades, there was a remarkable juxtaposition of conflicting
legal rules on limited liability in neighboring states. During the decade prior to
1830, Massachusetts and Rhode Island had unlimited liability while New Hamp-
shire, Connecticut, and Maine had limited liability. Such a contrast could be
expected to provide a fertile field for comparison of the impact of conflicting
legal rules on liability upon the pace of economic development.
In fact, there is little sign that the different legal rules on shareholder
liability adversely affected economic development in Massachusetts and Rhode
Island during this period. Although activity in New Hampshire and Connecticut
is reported to have been stimulated somewhat by the change to limited liability,
these states, nevertheless, continued to lag behind Massachusetts and Rhode
Island. Similarly, there was no discernable increase in incorporations when
Massachusetts abandoned unlimited liability for limited liability in 1830.'"1 Nor
was there any significant impact on Rhode Island during 1830 to 1847 when it
was the only state in New England still operating under unlimited liability."'0
Notwithstanding its less hospitable policy to business, Rhode Island retained its
position as the second most active state in textiles. The change of liability rule
in neighboring states did not have an impact that was important enough to
offset other factors.
Professor Dodd concludes that the experiences of Massachusetts until 1830,
Rhode Island until 1847, and England until 1855, show that the factory system
136. Pennsylvania issued only nine manufacturing charters by 1815, and only 15 by 1820. See
Miller, supra note 115, at 156-57.
137. Joint Stock Companies Act, 1850, 13 & 14 Vict., ch. 28 (Can.) See B. WELLING, CORPORATE
LAW IN CANADA 96-97 (1984).
138. See J. KENT, supra note 116, at 272-74 n.d.
139. This is illustrated by the number of incorporations in Massachusetts from 1828-1832:
1828, 23; 1829, 18; 1830 (enactment of limited liability), 4; 1831, 20; 1832, 18. See E. DODD,
supra note 20, at 383.
It is also confirmed by the number of manufacturing charters issued per decade: 1820-29, 146;
1830-35, 100. See 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH, supra note 79, at 162.
The foregoing contrasts with the contemporary complaints that Massachusetts was losing capital
investment to other states as a result of its policy on limited liability. See supra note 131.
140. Rhode Island enacted a limited liability statute in 1847. Act of June Session, 1847, R.I.
Acts & Resolves 30.
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can grow under a corporate framework featuring unlimited liability, but that it
probably does not grow as fast as under limited liability.'' Unlimited liability
may have slowed the extent of the distribution of shareownership. In view of
the still relatively limited capital needs of the time, this slower growth probably
made little difference. Professor Bruchey suggests that the industrial techniques
that required large amounts of capital were not developed until after 1835.14,
On the other hand, as capital needs of the new capitalist order became larger
and larger, this factor would have become increasingly significant.
6. Summary
The political struggle regarding limited liability did not fade away immediately
with the initial adoption of limited liability for manufacturing companies. There
were repeated attempts to revive unlimited liability, but they ultimately failed.
Michigan in 1837, 41 New Hampshire in 1842,141 Wisconsin in 1849,1-1 and Penn-
sylvania in 1853146 briefly turned to unlimited liability, but soon returned to
limited liability. Isolated special charters during this period also provided for
unlimited liability, but these too came to an end by the 1850's.
During this period, the Jacksonians were seeking to liberalize the corporation
laws through the enactment of both general incorporation and unlimited liability
provisions. 4' In the close political struggle with the interests pressing for limited
liability, the Jacksonians proved unable to gain both their objectives, and ul-
timately had to choose between them. They opted for general incorporation,
and unlimited liability fell by the wayside.
Thus, in the United States, limited liability was not perceived as an essential
attribute of the corporation," 8 and its acceptance was far from inevitable. It
emerged after the initial period of industrialization and came as a political
response to economic and political pressures, rather than as a necessary con-
sequence of the entity concept.
C. The Emergence of Limited Liability in the Civil Law (1808)
Under the influence of France, limited liability was accepted on the Continent
earlier than in the Anglo-American world. On the other hand, general incor-
poration statutes were enacted somewhat later. At the beginning of the nineteenth
141. See E. DODD, supra note 20, at 436.
142. S. BRUCHEY, supra note 105, at 139.
143. Act of Mar. 22, 1837, ch. 121, § 7, 1837 Mich. Laws 285, 286.
144. E.g., Act of June 24, 1842, ch. I, § 12, 1842 N.H. Laws 605, 607.
145. Wis. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 11 (1849), repealed by Act of Apr. 2, 1853.
146. E.g., Act of Apr. 18. 1853, ch. 335, § 13, 1853 Pa. Laws 567, 571.
147. See E. DODD, supra note 20, at 384-87. Butler suggests that general incorporation occurred
when the economic rents obtainable from state monopolies in corporate privileges decreased with
the development of a national free market in corporate privileges as a result of the expansion of
interstate commerce and the decision in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869). See Butler,
Nineteenth Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEG.
STUD. 129, 136-37 (1985).
148. Thus, neither Chief Justice Marshall nor Justice Washington, in Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636-37, 657-58 (1819), nor Chief Justice Nelson, in Thomas
v. Dakin, 22 Wend. 9, 71 (N.Y. 1839), mention unlimited liability as a corporate attribute in their
discussions of corporations.
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century, in France as in England, members of joint stock companies had unlimited
direct liability for the debts of the company; they also were subject to calls
from the company.149 In 1807, a brief and inadequate statute, the Napoleonic
Code de Commerce 0 provided for limited liability for stock corporations such
as the socits anonymes. This general enactment of limited liability, the first in
the Western world, promptly spread throughout Europe. 5 ' It was extended by
force of arms to a number of German provinces, Prussia, Italy, the Low
Countries, and Switzerland. 5 2 Limited liability survived the fall of Napoleon
with the adoption by various German states of local statutes modeled after the
Code de Commerce; the French Code also constituted the basis of the provincial
Italian legislation during the first half of the nineteenth century and of the
Spanish Code of 1829.151 Thus, limited liability generally was embraced by the
civil law earlier than in either the United States or England.
Without general incorporation, limited liability in France did not lead to
rapid growth in the number of corporations. From the initial adoption of the
Napoleonic Code de Commerce and the introduction of limited liability in 1807
to the adoption of the monumental corporation statute of 1867,1'1 the French
Government granted only 642 charters. 5 In just the eight years after the 1867
Act providing for general incorporation, 798 charters were issued in Paris alone,
or more than had been issued in the entire country during the previous sixty
years.'5 6 With the introduction of general incorporation in France in 1867, general
incorporation rapidly spread throughout Europe.'17
D. Later Survivals of Shareholder Liability
In the United States, despite the acceptance of limited liability in the early
nineteenth century, there were isolated survivals of shareholder liability for
corporate obligations. 8 Although in some cases, survival of shareholder liability
continued for almost a century, it had no significant influence on the development
of the law in this area and has disappeared almost entirely. Nevertheless, the
persistence of isolated pockets of shareholder liability is not without interest.
Among other things, it provides a fertile area for empirical examination to
determine what impact, if any, the change in the legal rule on liability actually
had on business activity. Unfortunately, although there are a number of theoretical
149. See C. FREEDEMAN, JOINT STOCK ENTERPRISES IN FRANCE, 1807-1867, at 17 (1979).
150. See C. COM. art. 33 (1807) (France).
151. A. CONRAD, Company Laws of the European Countries from an American Viewpoint
in HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW 45-46 (C. Schimtthoff ed. 1972); A. KUHN,
COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 56 (1912, reprinted 1968).
152. See D. SERUZIER, HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF THE FRENCH CODES 140-52 (D. Combe transl.
1979). The code was introduced "by way of the French army," which Seruzier cites as "evidence
of the determined and practical French mind." Id. at 140.
153. See A. KUHN, supra note 151, at 65-69, 85-86, 90; Macharzina, Corporate Forms and
Limited Liability in German Company Law, in LIMITED LIABILITY AND THE CORPORATION 44, 48
(T. Orhnial ed. 1982).
154. Loi Sur Les Socidtis, July 24, 1867, 1867 D.P. 4, 169
155. See C. FREEDEMAN, supra note 149, at 145-97.
156. See Minchinton, supra note 7, at 146-47.
157. See C. FREEDEMAN, supra note 149, at 144.
158. See E. DODD & R. BAKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1044-48 (lst ed.
1940).
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analyses of limited liability by economists, none has dealt with this aspect of
the problem.1 9 Even without empirical studies, it is hard to conclude that the
absence of limited liability in these special cases had serious consequences with
respect to entrepreneurial risk taking, capital investment, and general business
activity that most scholars have assumed.
1. Pro Rata Shareholder Liability in California (1849-1931)
One of the most important survivals of shareholder liability occurred in
California from 1849 to 1931. The California experience is particularly interesting
because it continued at an advanced stage of commercial and industrial devel-
opment for more than three quarters of a century, well into comparatively recent
times.
The California Constitutions of 1849160 and 1879161 and implementing statutes'
imposed on shareholders pro rata liability for all corporate debts and obligations
159. Meiners, Mofsky, and Tollison refer to the Massachusetts experience of 1809-1830 but
not to any of the subsequent developments. Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 6, at 362.
160. CAL. CONsr. oF 1849, art. IV, § 36. As part of the first constitution of California, §
36 provided: "Each stockholder of a corporation or joint stock association shall be individually
and personally liable for his proportion of all its debts and liabilities."
161. CAL. CONST. OF 1879, art. XII, § 3 (replaced the 1849 Constitution; repealed 1930).
Section 3 provided:
Each stockholder of a corporation or joint-stock association shall be individually and
personally liable for such proportion of all its debts and liabilities contracted or incurred
during the time he was a stockholder, as the amount of stock or shares owned by
him bears to the whole of the subscribed capital stock or shares of the corporation
or association.
162. Act of Apr. 22, 1850, ch. 128, § 32, 1850 Cal. Stat. 347, 350, as amended by the Act
of Apr. 27, 1863, ch. 518, § 1, 1863 Cal. Stat. 766. Section 32 provided:
Each stockholder of any corporation shall be severally individually and personally liable
for such proportion of all its debts and liabilities as the amount of stock owned by
him in such corporation bears to the whole of the capital stock of the corporation,
for the recovery of which joint and several actions may be instituted and prosecuted;
and in any such action against any of the stockholders of a corporation, the court
shall ascertain and determine the proportion of the debt which is the subject of the
suit for which each of the stockholders who are defendants in the action are severally
liable, and judgment shall be given severally in conformity therewith. If any stockholder
in a corporation shall pay his proportion of any debt due by such corporation he
shall be released and discharged from any further individual or personal liability for
such debt.
For a very different formulation of pro rata liability, see Act of Apr. 14, 1853, ch. 65, § 16,
1853 Cal. Stat. 87, 90, as amended by Act of Apr. 27, 1863, ch. 460, § 1, 1863 Cal. Stat. 736-
37, applicable only to mining corporations, infra note 167.
CAL. CIvtL CODE § 322 (repealed 1931) which superseded the Act of 1850 provided:
Each stockholder of a corporation is individually and personally liable for such pro-
portion of its debts and liabilities as the amount of such stock or shares owned by
him bears to the whole of the subscribed capital stock ... and for a like proportion
only of each debt or claim against the corporation. Any creditor of the corporation
may institute joint or several actions against any of its stockholders, for the proportion
of his claim payable by each, and in such action the court must ascertain the proportion
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incurred while they were shareholders.' 63 California law imposed liability on all
shareholders both of corporations incorporated under California law, without
regard to the law of the jurisdiction in which the debt was incurred, and foreign
corporations doing business in California with respect to debts arising in Cal-
ifornia.'6 Direct shareholder liability thus survived in California from 1849 to
1931 in an economic world overwhelmingly committed to limited liability.
California law imposed liability on a shareholder for the shareholder's
proportion of the total debts of the corporation. It was a direct, primary
obligation that any creditor could assert directly against the shareholder without
first instituting an action against the corporation.6 5 After 1850, the California
general corporation statutes provided for pro rata liability for which the share-
holder was liable only for the proportion of each creditor's claim represented
by the shareholder's proportional ownership of the stock of the corporation.'6
The California Act of 1853167 applicable only to mining corporations, however,
of the claim or debt for which each defendant is liable, and a several judgment may
be rendered against each, in conformity therewith.
The liability of each stockholder of a corporation formed, under the laws of any
other State or Territory of the United States, or of any foreign country, and doing
business within this State, shall be the same as the liability of a stockholder of a
corporation created under the constitution and laws of this State.
163. See generally 2 H. MARSH, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAW § 15.13 (2d ed. 1983) (the
best available summary description of the California experience); Hohfeld, Nature of Stockholders'
Individual Liability for Corporation Debts, 9 COLOM. L. REV. 285 (1909).
164. Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U.S. 221 (1914); CAL. CO NST., art. XII, § 15 (1879) (repealed
1930); Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 144 (1901); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 322, (repealed 1931). See Hohfeld,
supra note 163, at 319-20.
165. Anderson v. Schloesser, 153 Cal. 219, 222 (1908); Knowles v. Sandercock, 107 Cal. 629,
642 (1895); Hyman v. Coleman, 82 Cal. 650, 653 (1890). See, e.g., Morrow v. Superior Court, 64
Cal. 383, 386 (1883).
166. Gardiner v. Bank of Napa, 160 Cal. 577, 586-87, 117 P. 667, 670-71 (1911); Roebling's
Sons Co. v. Butler, 112 Cal. 677, 678-79, 45 P. 6 (1896); Morrow v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 383,
385-86 (1883). It is, of course, easy to ascertain the shareholder's proportional holding in the
corporation and the amount of the creditor's claim. Determination of the total amount of the debts
of the corporation is a much more difficult matter. This, no doubt contributed to the change in
the statute. The creditor's bill was the procedural remedy that was developed to deal with the
problem. See infra text accompanying notes 210-12.
167. Act of Apr. 14, 1853, ch. 65, § 16, 1853 Cal. Stat. 87, 90, as amended by Act of Apr.
27, 1863, ch. 460, § I, 1863 Cal. Stat. 736-37, applicable only to mining corporations, provided:
Each stockholder shall be individually and personally liable for his proportion of
all the debts and liabilities of the company contracted or incurred during the time
that he was a stockholder, for the recovery of which, joint or several actions may be
instituted and prosecuted. In any such action, whether joint or several, it shall be
competent for the defendant or defendants, or any or either of them, . .. to offer
evidence of . .. payment . . . of any debts or liabilities of such corporations; and
upon proof of such payment, the same shall be taken into account, and credited to
the party or parties making such payment; and judgment shall not be rendered against
the ... defendant, proving such payment for a sum exceeding the amount of his or
their proportion of the debts and liabilities of such incorporations, after deducting
therefrom the sums proven to have been paid ... on account thereof.
See Larrabee v. Baldwin, 35 Cal. 155, 169-77 (1868). A contrary construction would have flown
in the face of the second sentence of the statute. This provision, however, did not appear in the
general corporation acts including the Act of 1850 or Section 322 of the California Civil Code that
survived until 1931.
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utilized a very different form of pro rata liability. Under this early mining
corporation act, pro rata liability meant that a creditor was empowered to collect
from any shareholder the entire amount of a corporate obligation, but not in
excess of the shareholder's aggregate obligation, as measured by the shareholder's
.proportional ownership of the outstanding shares.'1
There were significant limitations. Contractual waivers of shareholder liability
were valid. Further, the statutory period for instituting actions was very restrictive.
Liability expired three years after the date on which the liability was incurred,
without regard to the maturity of the obligation (even where it exceeded three
years) or the date of the breach or default. 169 Such restrictive features obviously
limited the effectiveness of the provisions.
In 1929, the statute was amended to permit corporations to obtain limited
liability for their shareholders by inserting "Limited" or "Ltd." in their corporate
names.'70 In 1930, the constitutional provision was repealed, and the 1931 General
Corporation Law"' repealed the provisions of article 322 of the Civil Code
which had implemented the constitutional provision. Subsequent corporation laws
were entirely silent on the issue of shareholder liability.'
7 2
The most interesting questions with respect to this fascinating episode in
American corporate history are unanswered. For example, did this unique legal
rule have any significantly adverse impact on business activity as was asserted
by the forces pressing for repeal?"13 From California's rate of growth during
the eighty years in which the constitutional and statutory provisions were in
effect, it can be inferred that any such impact was limited; however, this inference
remains to be demonstrated by economic historians.
2. Double or Triple Liability for Shareholders Generally
Double liability for shareholders (i.e. liability for corporate obligations in
an amount equal to the par value of their shares) arose in American law during
the early nineteenth century after unlimited liability had been discarded reluctantly
168. This form of pro rata liability was not unique. It was utilized in other jurisdictions as
well. E.g., Hatch v. Burroughs, II F. Cas. 795 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1870) (No. 6203); Branch v. Baker,
53 Ga. 502 (1874); Lane v. Harris, 16 Ga. 217 (1854) (legislative bank charters). See generally I
C. BEACH, COMMENTARItEs ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 154, at 280 (1891).
Since this form of pro rata liability, unlike the other, requires a determination of the total
debts of the corporation in order to determine the maximum obligation of a shareholder, it appears
to present serious problems of implementation as a practical matter, except as an integral part of
a general insolvency or bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, in a suit to enforce bank double shareholder
liability, a Massachusetts court held in 1846 that a suit by an individual creditor would not lie.
The court required that either all creditors join in a single suit or that one or more creditors file
a creditors' bill for the benefit of all creditors against all shareholders. Crease v. Babcock, 52 Mass.
557, 560 (1846).
169. 2 H. MARSH, supra note 163, § 15.13, at 330.
170. Act of May 23, 1929, ch. 418, § 1, 1929 Cal. Stat. 740.
171. Act of June 12, 1931, ch. 862, § 1, 1931 Cal. Stat. 1762, 1763.
172. Mr. Marsh reports that the Drafting Committee of the 1977 Act was content with the
implication of limited liability arising from the nature of the corporation as a separate legal personality
and the constitutional and statutory history. See 2 H. MARSH, supra note 163, § 15.13, at 331-32.
173. See I H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS § I n.2 (1962).
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in favor of general incorporation statutes. New York in its general incorporation
act of 1811," 71 and New Jersey in 1816,' s included provisions for double liability
for shareholders generally. Professor Hurst reports that such explicit statutorily
qualified liability for shareholders was common between 1810 to 1860.176 Writing
as late as 1891, Beach described such liability as applicable in nearly all states. 7'
Although most of such statutes provided for double liability, some, as in
Colorado, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, provided for triple liability.'1
7
While some statutes imposed joint and several liability, others imposed pro
rata liability. Many statutes imposed statutory liability for the "debts contracted
by the corporation." Initially, this provision was construed to include tort
liability.'" 9 Subsequently, as limited liability became accepted as the underlying
rule, the statutes were construed more strictly to exclude tort liability. 80 Even-
tually, these general statutes disappeared, while statutes imposing double liability
on the shareholders of banks survived. As late as 1923, however, New York
authorized the optional inclusion of a provision in the certificate of incorporation
that imposed double liability.' 8'
3. Double Liability for Shareholders of Banks
While the double liability statutes of general application gradually disap-
peared, double liability for shareholders of bank corporations survived until well
into the present century. Designed as a measure of protection for bank de-
positors,8 2 such statutes had been enacted widely and survived until after the
Great Depression. 8 3
On the federal scene, double liability for shareholders of national banks
first appeared in the National Bank Act of 1864,194 which was reenacted in
section 23 of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913.18 - The federal statute applied to
the actual beneficial owner or the owner of record of shares of national banks.
174. Act of March 22, 1811, ch. 67, § 7, 1811 N.Y. Laws 111, 113. See Howard, supra note
133.
175. 40th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sitting, 1816 N.J. Laws 77.
176. See J. HURsT, supra note 79, at 27.
177. See I C. BEACH, supra note 168, § 143, at 268.
178. See I W. COOK, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 675 n.1 (8th ed. 1923).
179. Carver v. The Braintree Mfg. Co., 5 F. Cas. 235 (C.C.D. Mass 1843) (No. 2,485) (Story,J.).
180. Chase v. Curtis, 113 U.S. 452 (1885); Child v. Boston Iron Works, 137 Mass. 516 (1884);
Cable v. McCune, 26 Mo. 371 (1858). Cf Stanton v. Wilkeson, 22 F. Cas. 1074, 1077 (S.D.N.Y.
1876) (No. 13,299) See W. COOK, STOCKHOLDERS AND CORPORATION LAW § 217 (3d ed. 1884).
181. Act of Apr. 16, 1901, ch. 354, § 54, 1901 N.Y. Laws 961, 971-72 (repealed 1923).
182. The collection rate on bank shareholder statutory assessments during the depression was
48.29%..See Hearings on H.R. 141 before House Committee on Banking & Currency, 71st Cong.,
2d Sess. 76 (1930). As a result of such factors as this low collection rate, a 10 to I ratio of deposits
to stock, id. at 16, and litigation expense, double liability provided protection for less than five
percent of deposits as a practical matter. See also Legislation Note, Branch, Chain & Group Banking,
48 HARV. L. REV. 659, 669 n.77 (1935).
183. See generally 13A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §
6224.1 (rev. perm. ed. 1984); Vincens, On the Demise of Double Liability of Bank Shareholders,
12 Bus. LAW. 275 (1957).
184. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 12, 13 Stat. 99, 102-03 (1864).
185. Act of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, § 23, 38 Stat. 251, 273 (1913) (amended 1933 and 1935;
repealed 1959).
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Double liability for bank shareholders was the common pattern under state law
for state banks as well. As late as 1926, thirty-five states had statutes imposing
double liability (and in Colorado, triple liability) on shareholders of state banks., 86
The development of banking groups inevitably led to the question of whether
shareholders in bank holding companies were subject to the statutory double
liability imposed on bank shareholders when the holding company was unable
to satisfy the obligation. Only the Wisconsin double liability statute expressly
imposed such liability,'87 and the other statutes did not deal with the issue.
In Anderson v. Abbott,' 8 one of the landmark cases in the law of corporate
groups, the Supreme Court of the United States held in a five to four decision
that the federal statute was applicable to the shareholders of a parent corporation
which held the shares of the constituent banks in the group."' In the only other
case that involved this issue, Fors v. Farrell,'9 the Michigan Supreme Court
reached the same result under the comparable Michigan statute.' 9'
In the financial disasters of the Great Depression, double liability proved
ineffective,' 92 and the country turned to deposit insurance as a more effective
measure for the protection of depositors. In 1933 and 1935, Congress amended
the National Banking Act to permit national banks to escape double liability
by giving six month's notice.' 9 The provision for double liability became a dead
letter and finally was repealed in 1959."94
The states followed suit, sometimes repealing a statute, sometimes terminating
liability only for corporations that insured depositors with the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, gave public notice, or maintained a specified surplus.' -
As a practical matter, double liability for bank shareholders became a thing of
the past after dominating the banking scene for three-quarters of a century.
4. Shareholder Liability for Wage Claims
Another area of surviving shareholder liability for corporate obliga-
tions involves obligations to employees. As late as the 1960's, there were
as many as six states that by constitution or statute imposed some form of
liability on shareholders (or insiders) for unpaid wages of corporate
employees." 6  Today, such statutes survive only in New York"97
186. See Vincens, supra note 183, at 275.
187, WIs. STAT. § 221.56 (1933). See Legislation Note, supra note 182, at 669 n.77.
188. 321 U.S. 349 (1944).
189, Id. at 362-65.
190. 271 Mich. 358, 260 N.W. 886 (1935).
191. Id. at 365-75, 260 N.W. at 888-92.
192. See Hearings on H.R. 141 before House Committee on Banking & Currency, 71st Cong.,
2d Sess. 17 (1930) ("inadequate protection to depositors" and a "great hardship to the shareholders").
193. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 22, 48 Stat. 162, 189 (1933) (repealed 1959); Act of
Aug. 23, 1935. ch. 614, § 304, 49 Stat. 684, 708 (1935) (repealed 1959).
194. PUa. L. No. 86-230, § 7, 73 Stat. 457 (1959).
195, See Vincens, supra note 183, at 276-78.
196. Massachusetts (repealed 1965); Michigan (repealed 1973); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 630
(McKinney Supp. 1986); Pennsylvania (repealed 1966); Tennessee (repealed 1969); WIs. STAT. §
180.40(6) (1981-82). See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 548-50 (3d ed. 1983).
197. N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 630 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1986). See Brownell, The Not-
So-Limited Liability of Stockholders of New York Corporations, 27 N.Y. ST. BAR BULL. 58 (1955);
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and in Wisconsin.'"8
The current New York statute"9 adopted in 1963 applies only to closely
held companies. Listed companies, companies with shares that are quoted over-
the-counter, and registered investment companies are excluded.2 °° Joint and several
liability for salaries and wages of employees is imposed on the ten largest holders
of beneficial interests.20' The action may be brought only after a judgment has
been obtained against the corporation and returned unsatisfied; shareholders who
have paid more than their pro rata share are entitled to contribution from the
other shareholders. 20 2 The statute applies only to New York corporations. The
New York Court of Appeals has held that the statute does not apply to the
shareholders of a foreign corporation doing business in New York and owing
wages to New York employees.2 03
Under the previous New York statute, all shareholders were subject to joint
and several liability, employee claims had to be filed within thirty days, and
there was no express provision for contribution.30 These features in the older
statute meant that liability fell very unevenly. Thus, in the failure of The New
York Compass, less than fifteen of 2,300 shareholders are reported to have paid
$70,000 to settle outstanding wage claims of $130,000.20, Shareholders beyond
the jurisdiction of New York escaped liability. Reflecting this unfortunate ex-
perience, the 1963 amendment of the statute severely cut back the scope of the
statute.
The Wisconsin statute2°6 that imposes liability for wages is a survivor of
an older Wisconsin tradition that can be traced to the 1849 Wisconsin statute20 7
that imposed liability on shareholders for corporate obligations generally. It goes
well beyond the New York statute in a number of respects. The Wisconsin
statute applies to the following: all shareholders, not merely the ten largest;
public as well as closely held corporations; and foreign corporations doing business
in Wisconsin. 08 The statutory period for suit is extended to two years. On the
other hand, without regard to the amount of the wage claim, liability is limited
to the aggregate par value of a shareholder's interest (or in the case of no par
shares, to the amount of the consideration for which the shares were issued).2°9
Rogers & McManus, Stockholders' Booby-Trap: Partnership Liabilities of Stockholders under Section
71, New York Stock Corporation Law, 28 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1149 (1953); Comment, Shareholder
Liability for Wages: Section 630 of the New York Business Corporation Law, 30 FORDHAM L. REv.
471 (1962).
198. WIs. STAT. § 180.40(6) (1981-82). See Davis, Shareholder Liability for Claims by Employees,
1984 Wis. L. REV. 741.
199. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 630(a),(c) (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1986).
200. Id. § 630(a).
201. Id
202. Id. § 630(a)(c).
203. Armstrong v. Dyer, 268 N.Y. 671, 672, 198 N.E. 551, 552 (1935) (mem.). The Armstrong
decision construed N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 71, (repealed 1963), predecessor of section 630 of the
New York Business Corporation Law, which does not differ in this respect.
204. Act of May 24, 1923, ch. 787, § 71, 1923 N.Y. Laws 1377, 1406 (repealed 1963).
205. See Brownell, supra note 197; Rogers & McManus, supra note 197, at 1155; Comment,
supra note 197, at 473, 475.
206. WIs. STAT. § 180.40(6) (1981-82); see Davis, supra note 198.
207. Wis. REv. STAT. ch. 51, § 12 (1849).
208. Wts. STAT. § 180.40(6) (1981-82). See Joncas v. Krueger, 61 Wis. 2d 529, 213 N.W.2d
1 (1973).
209. WIs. STAT. § 180.40(6) (1981-82).
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5. Summary
The numerous experiences with jurisdictions imposing some form of liability
on shareholders provide a valuable source of empirical data regarding the eco-
nomic impact of a change in the fundamental legal rules governing the conduct
of corporate enterprise. Definitive evaluation of the significance of limited liability
on economic behavior must await such studies which, as noted previously, do
not seem to be available.
E. Procedures for Enforcing Shareholder Liability
A historical review of the periods of American law in which liability was
imposed upon shareholders for corporate obligations would not be complete
without a description of the procedures developed for enforcing such liability.
The theoretical reviews by economists regarding the feasibility of such a legal
rule fail to discuss this aspect of the actual experience. In fact, state law passed
through several stages of development before finally achieving what appears, at
least on the surface, to be an effective system for enforcing such liability. The
historical sources of this development and court records must be examined before
any reliable judgment may be reached on the efficiency of the enforcement
system.
Effective enforcement of shareholder statutory liability for corporate obli-
gations was ultimately achieved through development of a device in equity
procedure known as the creditors' bill. 210 Before the creditors' bill emerged, the
law functioned under a crude system in which any creditor with an unsatisfied
judgment against the corporation sued any shareholder at common law. This
system proved unsatisfactory because liability was borne unequally, reflecting
caprice, or whim, or a rich target.211
The equitable procedure, the creditors' bill, was developed in response to
these problems. In its final form, the creditors' bill was a proceeding instituted
by any creditor with an unsatisfied judgment, usually on behalf of all creditors,
against the corporate debtor. It normally could be instituted only in the state
of incorporation. The relief sought typically included the appointment of a
receiver for the corporation, the determination of aggregate corporate liabilities
unsatisfied by the assets of the corporation, and a determination of the liability
per share of the shareholders for the unsatisfied obligations. Even though
shareholders may not have been residents of the state of incorporation, had not
been parties, and had received no notice, the judgment was res judicata against
such shareholders as to all issues other than defenses personal to the shareholder,
such as identity as a shareholder or the number of shares in fact held. 2 1 With
the accuracy of the shareholder's list the only basic question remaining, the
subsequent proceedings against individual shareholders likely proceeded by de-
210. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 308 comment e (1971);
Abbot, Conflict of Laws and the Enforcement of the Statutory Liability of Stockholders in a Foreign
Corporation, 23 HARv. L. REv. 37 (1909).
211. See Abbot, supra note 210, at 41. In fact, these are the very evils that the economists
enumerate in their theoretical analysis of the consequences of a rule other than limited liability.
As will be seen, the subsequent development of the creditors' bill eliminated many of these features.
212. Goss v. Carter, 156 F. 746, 751 (Sth Cir. 1907).
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fault. Thus, as finally developed, the legal framework was firmly in place for
obtaining both the underlying judgment and the follow-up collection judgments.
Collection suits against individual shareholders were still necessary. In view
of the pro forma nature of the proceedings, they obviously presented no significant
problems of practical implementation other than the burden of service of process.
With the modern development of elaborate procedures for the conduct of class
actions, the practical difficulties involved in the follow-up collection efforts
would have been further reduced.
Because shareholder liability under statute has almost been eliminated com-
pletely, this review is only of historical interest. However, it is included to
provide a more realistic description of the functioning of a judicial system with
a legal rule for shareholder liability. It provides the historical and legal background
for a review of the theoretical analyses of economists on the likely economic
impact of shareholder liability rules.
F. Summary
For more than 150 years in the United States and Continental Europe, and
for more than 100 years in England, limited liability for shareholders has been
the firmly established legal principle underlying corporation law. This fundamental
policy emerged after political and economic struggle. It was intended to stimulate
economic activity by encouraging widespread investment in corporate shares.
Such investment would result from protecting investors against liability to cor-
porate creditors and by limiting their risk to the loss of their investment in the
corporation.
The triumph of limited liability flows from concerns of policy, not from
any conceptual notion of the nature of the corporation. For many years, the
acceptance of the principle was uneven. In a number of areas, pockets of
shareholder liability survived, demonstrating that limited liability is not an es-
sential condition for capitalist economic activity.
Over the historical period in which these dramatic changes occurred, the
form of the business firm has changed remarkably. Limited liability triumphed
at a time when corporations were simple, when one corporation could not acquire
and own the shares of another. Limited liability meant protection for the ultimate
investor. Long after corporations were firmly established, corporations generally
were first granted the power to acquire and own shares of other corporations.
Major business rapidly changed form with the emergence of complex multi-
tiered corporate structures that included a parent corporation and numerous
affiliated corporations collectively conducting the business of the group. Limited
liability no longer meant protection for the ultimate investor alone. It also meant
protection for the parent corporation against liability for the obligations of its
subsidiaries, even if they were conducting essential parts of a single, unitary
business. Whether this development was advantageous or disadvantageous, it
was neither anticipated nor intended.
This historical background should be kept in mind during the review and
evaluation of the legal rules for the imposition of liability on a parent corporation
for the substantive obligations of its subsidiaries, rules that rest on the pressure
to implement a policy of limited liability. Similarly, this background should be
kept in mind during the subsequent review of the economic analyses, which
often address solely the situation of the simple corporation with ultimate investors
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as shareholders. Thus, these economic analyses neglect the problems presented
by corporate groups (a parent and dozens or even hundreds of subsidiary
corporations) that are responsible today for the conduct of the great bulk of
the economic activity in the industrialized world.
III. THE EMERGENCE OF CORPORATE GROUPS (1889)
Corporate groups emerged in the United States with the liberalization of
state corporation laws that authorized corporations, generally for the first time,
to acquire and own the shares of other corporations. This process commenced
in New Jersey in 1889.211 Thus, limited liability became established firmly in
the American legal system at a time when corporate groups were relatively
unknown and only ultimate investors were protected by the rule. After cor-
porations became able to own the shares of other corporations and corporate
groups arose, the controlled corporation (subsidiary) and its controlling share-
holder (parent) collectively comprised and conducted the enterprise. At issue was
whether the components of the enterprise, as well as the ultimate investors, were
to be shielded from liability for the debts of the enterprise. The courts apparently
did not recognize, and certainly did not discuss, this very different issue that
emerged for the first time, an issue that went well beyond the question of liability:
whether one or two legal entities were involved. Limited liability for corporate
groups, one of the most important legal rules in modern economic society,
appears to have emerged as an historical accident.
A. Corporate Ownership of Shares of Another Corporation
Decades after the acceptance of the concept of limited liability in the United
States, corporations still lacked the power to own the shares of another cor-
poration unless expressly authorized by statute or charter. Corporate ownership
of the shares of another corporation also came late in England.
1. The American Development (1889)
The American development of corporate ownership of the shares of another
corporation and the emergence of corporate groups began with the railroads.
The unique operations of railroads led to the development of a system of
contiguous roads connecting important centers. In turn, interlocking operations
resulted in interlocking security ownership.234 Early authorizations of stock own-
ership were granted to such corporations as the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad in
1832, the Pennsylvania Railroad in 1864 and the Western Union Telegraph
Company in 1864.1Is Such provisions also appeared in the charters of other
213. See infra text accompanying note 223.
214. See W. NOYES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INTERCORPORATE RELATIONS § 271 (2d ed.
1909). Maryland banks were also authorized to invest in stocks to provide capital for other
corporations, but this does not appear to include acquisitions for control. See Brandi, supra note
79. at 19.
215. Robinson, The Holding Company (pt. I), 18 YALE REv. 390, 400-01, 404 (1910).
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railroad, bridge, steamship, and canal companies, but rarely in the case of
manufacturing company charters.21 6
The power of a corporation to own the shares of another corporation
presented no question of ultra vires if the statute or charter so provided. -2 1 7 In
the absence of an express provision in the statute or charter, it was settled that
acquisition by one corporation of another corporation's shares was ultra vires,21-
whether the acquisition was for purposes of control or investment. 219 Several
reasons were advanced. First, the doctrine of ultra vires was seen as a necessary
barrier to the evasion of legislative limitations on corporate objectives.2 0 Second,
courts strictly construed the legislative failure to include the power to acquire
shares of another corporation in the statutory enumeration of corporate powers
by holding that such failure was an indication of an intention to exclude such
216. See J. BONBRIGHT & G. MEANS, THE HOLDING COMPANY - ITS PUBLIC SiGNIFICANCE AND
ITS REGULATION 58-65 (1932, reprinted 1969); Compton, Early History of Stock Ownership bv
Corporations, 9 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 125, 127-30 (1940).
217. People ex rel. Peabody v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 Ill. 268, 288 (1889). it was even
held that in the absence of statutory authorization, a provision in the charter expressly authorizing
the purchase and ownership of the stock of another corporation was ineffective to authorize such
action. Id.
218. E.g., De La Vergne Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. German Say. Inst., 175 U.S. 40. 54-55
(1899) (National Banking Act); California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362, 366-70 (1897) (National
Banking Act); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677, 698 (1896); First Nat'l Bank v.
Nat'l Exch. Bank, 92 U.S. 122, 127-28 (1875) (National Banking Act); Sumner v. Marcy, 23 Fed.
Cas. 384, 385-86, (C.C.D. Me. 1847) (No. 13,609); Hazelhurst v. Savannah, G. & N.A.R.R., 43
Ga. 14 (1871); Central R.R. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582, 589-90 (1869); Franklin Co. v. Lewiston Inst.
for Say., 68 Me. 43, 46 (1877); Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co., 64 N.J. Eq. 673, 682, 53 A.
842, 851 (1903); Parsons v. Tacoma Smelting & Ref. Co., 65 Pac. 765, 768 (Wash. 1901). See
Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541, 556 (1933) ("The power to hold stock in other
corporations was not conferred or implied. The holding company was impossible.") (Brandeis, J.);
S. BRICE, TREATISE ON THE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA ViRES 91-92 (2d Am. ed A. Green ed. 1880); W.
CLARK, LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 183-86 (3d ed. 1. Wormser ed. 1916); 6A W. FLETCHER,
supra note 183, §§ 2824-26; 1 V. MORAWETZ, LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 431 (2d ed. 1886);
4 S. THOMPSON, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4056 (3d ed. 1927); Compton, supra note 216, at 131
n.14.
Maryland and Iowa were apparently alone in allowing intercorporate stock ownership in the
absence of express authorization by charter or statute. Iowa: Traer v. Lucas Prospecting Co., 124
Iowa 107, 116, 99 N.W. 290, 294 (1904); White v. G. W. Marquardt & Sons, 105 Iowa 145, 147,
74 N.W. 930, 930 (1898); Calumet Paper Co. v. Stotts Inv. Co., 96 Iowa 147, 152-53, 64 N.W.
782, 783-84 (1895). Maryland: Davis v. United States Elec. Power & Light Co., 77 Md. 35, 39
(1893); Booth v. Robinson, 55 Md. 419, 433-34 (1880). The Maryland decisions apparently rested
on a misreading of the English authorities. Id. at 434.
One New York case took a middle ground. After terming an intercorporate stock acquisition
unlawful, a lower court allowed the corporate shareholder to retain dividends but not to vote.
Milbank v. N.Y.L.E. & W.R.R., 64 How. Pr. 20, 27-28 (N.Y. Sup. C1. 1882).
A few early statutes expressly prohibited corporate ownership of stock of another corporation.
E.g., Act of Feb. 10, 1849, § 8, 1846-1849 Ill. Laws 89; Act of Jan. 12, 1860, ch. I, § 1, 1860
Md. Laws 1-2; Act of Mar. 22, 1811, ch. 67, § 7, 1811 N.Y. Laws 111, 113. See 3. BONBRIGHT
& G. MEANS, supra note 216, at 56 n.l.
219. Acquisitions in the ordinary course of business or by way of security were excluded from
the prohibition. See 6A W. FLETCHER, supra note 183, § 2832, at 323; 1 V. MORAWETZ, supra
note 218, § 431, at 406-07.
220. See, e.g., Franklin Co. v. Lewiston Inst. for Say., 68 Me. 43, 46 (1877); 1 V. MORAWETZ,
supra note 218, § 431, at 406-07.
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power. 2 ' The exercise of such power without express authority was therefore
ultra vires. Third, purchases of stock were seen as a means of acquiring control
or accomplishing a monopoly.
222
More than fifty years after limited liability for corporations had become
accepted, American law authorized corporations generally to acquire and own
the shares of another corporation. The change first occurred in New Jersey.
During the years 1888-1893, New Jersey amended its corporation laws to authorize
intercorporate stock ownership generally. 2 3 Other American jurisdictions followed
suit, although at a slower pace than generally recognized; by 1910, only thirteen
states had adopted such statutes.22' Eventually, however, the authority of a
corporation to own the shares of another corporation became universally rec-
ognized.22'
The change in the law opened the way to a profound change in corporate
structure. Corporations began to organize other corporations to conduct parts
of their business and to acquire other corporations as an alternative method of
expansion. Professor Alfred Chandler describes this change as a turning point
in the evolution of American business.22 6 With this development, a corporation
no longer represented the entire enterprise. The enterprise became increasingly
fragmented among parent and subsidiary corporations. In contrast to the simple
corporation with its bright line of distinction between the enterprise conducted
by the corporation and the investor represented by the shareholder, the corporate
group was quite different; the parent (as the shareholder) and the subsidiary
collectively made up the enterprise. In the simple corporation, the insulation of
the shareholder as investor from liability for the debts of the enterprise was
accomplished by limited liability for the investor. In the corporate group, the
extension of limited liability to the parent was not necessary to accomplish this
result. The parent's shareholders already benefitted from limited liability, and
insulation of the parent created a second layer of protection.
Nevertheless, dazzled by the concept of the corporation as a separate entity,
the same rule apparently was applied unthinkingly and automatically to the
parent corporation. Limited liability was accorded to the parent without reali-
zation that the relation of parent to subsidiary, where both comprised the
221. De La Vergne Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. German Say. Inst., 175 U.S, 40, 55 (1899);
California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362, 366-67 (1897); First Nat'l Bank v. Nat'l Exch. Bank,
92 U.S. 122, 128 (1875).
222. 4 S. THOMPSON. supra note 218, §§ 4063-75.
223. Act of April 4, 1888, ch. 269, § 1, 1888 N.J. Laws 385-86; Act of April 17, 1888, ch.
295, § 1, 1888 N.J. Laws 445-46; Act of May 9, 1889, ch. 265, § 4, 1889 N.J. Laws 412, 414;
Act of Mar. 14, 1893, ch. 171, § 2, 1893 N.J. Laws 301. Ironically, New Jersey repealed its
authorization of intercorporate stock ownership under the influence of Woodrow Wilson in 1913.
The reform lasted only four years. See J. BONBRIGHT & G. MEANS, supra note 216, at 57.
224. See Robinson, The Holding Company, (pt. 2), 19 YALE Rav. 13, 29 (1910).
225. See H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 9, at 39 (rev. ed. 1946); Freedland, History of
Holding Company Legislation in New York State: Some Doubts as to the "New Jersey First'"
Tradition, 24 FORDHAM L. REV. 369, 396-97 (1955); Note, Power of a Corporation To Purchase
the Shares of Another Corporation, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 281, 284-86 (1931).
226. See A. CHANDLER, supra note 3, at 30. Professor Berle concluded that with this statutory
change, "corporate finance entered an entirely new phase." Berle, Foreword to E. LATry, SussrDLARas
AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS, at iv (1936).
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enterprise, was markedly different from the relation of investor to the enterprise.
2. The English Experience (1867)
The development in the English law differed from the American experience
because of the different English legal framework for the issuance of charters.
Unlike the United States where general corporation statutes, not articles of
incorporation, largely specified the powers of a corporation, the Companies
Act, 1862227 provided for incorporation via the registration of companies with
the company powers specified not only in the statute, but also in the company's
memorandum of association. There was no comparable doctrine existing in the
United States at that time. Rather, the American courts strictly limited the
corporate powers in the charter to those authorized, expressly or impliedly by
the statute. 2 8 On the other hand, in England the corporate power to acquire
and own the shares of another corporation could arise from provisions inserted
in the memorandum by the promoters and their counsel, notwithstanding the
omission of such power in the incorporation statute.
If the memorandum of association was silent, it was ultra vires for a
company to purchase shares of another company.2 29 However, if the memorandum
of association so provided, In re Barned's Banking Company2 30 and In re Asiatic
Banking Corporation3 ' held that the power existed and that neither the common
law nor the 1862 Act was to the contrary. Both courts found helpful, but
inconclusive, references to "corporations" in the definition of "persons" who
could become "members" in the 1862 Companies Act.2"' These references en-
couraged them in their conclusion that intercompany stock ownership was con-
templated, or at least not forbidden, under the statutory scheme.
With these cases providing direction, the power to acquire and own shares
of another corporation was thereafter conveniently achieved by attention to the
drafting of the memorandum of association. By this different route, the English
law reached the same result that statutory reform accomplished in the United
States several decades later.
In re European Society Arbitration Accounts"' is almost alone in its per-
ception of the interrelation of intercompany stock ownership and limited liability.
In other cases, the power of a company to purchase and own shares of another
company was discussed and acknowledged without apparent awareness of the
consequence of such a change in creating two levels of limited liability sheltering
the parent corporation as well as the the shareholders of the parent.
227. 25 & 26 Vict., ch. 89 (1862).
228. Cf. People ex rel. Peabody v. Chicago Gas Trust Co.. 130 III. 268, 288 (1889).
229. In re European Society Arbitration Accounts, 8 Ch. D. 679, 692 (1878); Great E. Ry.
v. Turner, 8 L.R.-Ch. 149, 151-52 (1872). See William Thomas & Co. v. Sully, [19151 I Ch. 325,
329-30 (1914) (generally speaking, companies registered under the 1862 Act cannot acquire shares
unless the memorandum of association so authorizes, but such authorization may be implied); In
re Asiatic Banking Corp., 4 L.R.-Ch. 252, 262 (1869) (Giffard, J.). Cf. Joint Stock Discount Co.
v. Brown, 3 L.R.-Eq. 139, 149 (1866); Maunsell v. Midland Great W. Ry., 71 Eng. Rep. 58, 72
(1863); Salomons v. Laing, 50 Eng. Rep. 1091, 1096 (1850).
230. 3 L.R.-Ch. 105, 112-13 (1867).
231. 4 L.R.-Ch. 252, 257 (1869).
232. Barned's Banking, 3 L.R.-Ch. at 113; Asiatic Banking, 4 L.R.-Ch. at 257.
233. 8 Ch. D. 679 (1878).
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In European Society, the court held ultra vires the purchase by one company
of the shares of another.3 4 Neither company had received the full subscription
price of its shares from the shareholders. The court noted that this failure, in
effect, meant that the call liability for payment of the balance of the subscription
price of the purchased shares was being piled on top of the call liability of the
shareholders of the purchasing company to pay the balance of the subscription
price for their shares in the purchasing company.2 13 The court pointed out that
the purchasing company's memorandum of association provided limited liability
for the members; this additional exposure of the purchasing company to calls
on the purchased shares undermined the usefulness of the limited liability pro-
vision . 36
A similar focus on the impact of the limited liability rule as applied to the
related question of the insulation from liability of a parent corporation from
its subsidiary's obligations might have yielded a more fruitful analysis than
unreflective application of the entity doctrine. Instead, the automatic application
of the entity doctrine produced multiple layers of liability for the parent cor-
poration and the parent's shareholders.
B. . The Initial Application of Limited Liability to Corporate Groups
There are a handful of early American cases, primarily involving railroads,
that consider the legal interrelationship of parent and subsidiary corporations.
Whether involving issues of procedure, contract construction, or the imposition
of tort or contract liability, each of the cases examined the question solely by
reference to entity law, emphasizing the separate legal identity of the related
companies. The cases dealing with imposition of tort or contract liability provide
no indication of a realization that imposition of such liability presented a different
issue than whether one or two entities were involved.
Van Allen v. Assessors,"1 7 decided in 1865, appears to be the earliest case.
In Van Allen, the Supreme Court held that because a corporation and its
shareholders were separate, it was not unconstitutional for a state to tax a
shareholder's stock in a national bank.2 3 8
The leading case, Pullman's Palace Car Company v. Missouri Pacific Rail-
way,219 was decided by the Supreme Court twenty years later in 1885. The Court
held that a railroad parent corporation's contractual obligation to haul Pullman
cars on all roads that it owned or controlled did not include the roads of its
subsidiary. 240 The Court emphasized that although the parent controlled the
subsidiary, the companies were separate with separate boards of directors and
that the affairs of the subsidiary were controlled by the subsidiary's directors.
24
'
For courts preoccupied with entity law, this decision involving construction of
234. Id. at 704.
235. Id. at 705-08.
236. Id.
237. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 573 (1865).
238. Id. at 398.
239. 115 U.S. 587 (1885).
240. Id. at 595-96.
241. Id. at 596-97.
The Journal of Corporation Law
a contract became authority supporting a conclusion that a parent corporation
had no liability for the contracts and torts of its subsidiary.
In another contract construction case, '242 a South Carolina court had earlier
stressed the separate identity of the related corporations and held that the parent's
ownership of the subsidiary's stock did not affect the identity of the subsidiary . 4
Emphasizing the separate identity of parent and subsidiary, still another early
case2" had held that a subsidiary is an indispensable party defendant in a suit
against its parent where the suit involved the construction of a railroad lease
by the subsidiary to the parent. 243
When for the first time courts considered the very different issue of the
imposition of liability on a parent for the unsatisfied obligations of a subsidiary,
these decisions reflecting entity law were influential. The courts proceeded in
identical fashion, emphasizing the separate identity of the two corporations
without any reference to the resulting creation of double layers of insulation
from liability. 246 Courts recognized that notwithstanding such a general rule, a
parent could be liable if the subsidiary had acted as its agent or if some
concealment or misrepresentation gave rise to estoppel, 24 " or where assets conveyed
to a corporation's shareholders constituted a fraudulent transfer. 24 There was,
however, neither discussion nor apparent realization that a second layer of
immunity of the parent from liability was being added to the limited liability
already accorded to the parent's shareholders.
Limited liability in Anglo-American law was established firmly at a time
when corporations generally lacked the power to acquire and own shares of
another corporation. Such power came much later. When corporations received
such power and a parent-subsidiary structure for the first time became possible,
there was no apparent consideration of the crucial question of whether the
doctrine of limited liability should protect a parent corporation from liability
for the debts of its subsidiary. When the question of intragroup liability sub-
sequently arose, it was without discussion resolved by reference to the entity
concept to which limited liability had become inseparably annexed.
A fundamental principle had been accepted in the corporation law apparently
without consideration whether such acceptance was sound. History clearly dem-
onstrates this lack of consideration. This failure does not indicate that the
extension of limited liability to parent corporations was either unsound or
undesirable. It does emphasize, however, the desirability of a searching reex-
242. Gibbs v. Greenville & Columbia R.R., 20 S.C. 179 (1882).
243. Id. at 190.
244. Jessup v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 36 F. 735 (C.C.N.D. III. 1888).
245. Id. at 741.
246. Torts: Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. v. Cochran, 43 Kan. "225, 234-35, 23 P. 151,
154-55 (1890); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. v. Davis, 34 Kan. 209, 210, 8 P. 530, 531
(1885); Cf. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Jones, 155 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1894).
Contracts: Richmond & I. Constr. Co. v. Richmond, N. 1. & B. R.R., 68 F. 105, 107-09 (6th
Cir. 1895); Central Trust Co. v. Bridges, 57 F. 753, 764-66 (6th Cir. 1893) (Taft, J.); Exchange
Bank v. Macon Constr. Co., 97 Ga. 1, 7-8, 25 S.E. 326, 328 (1895). All three of these cases oddly
involve the attempted imposition of liability on a railroad subsidiary of the construction contract
debt of its parent.
247. Central Trust Co. v. Bridges, 57 F. 753, 766 (6th Cir. 1893).
248. Montgomery Web Co. v. H. Dienelt, 133 Pa. St. 585, 595-96 (1890).
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amination of the rule, even though it has been been an accepted part of
corporation law for almost a century.
IV. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
A. The Economists' Analysis of Limited Liability
It is useful to review the speculations of economists and legal commentators
regarding the economic impact of shareholder liability rules on the functioning
of corporations and the capital, product, and stock markets in which they
operate. 249 As noted in the preceding historical analysis, there are numerous
examples of legal systems in which corporations have functioned with some form
of shareholder liability. It is unfortunate that with one partial exception, 2 0 the
discussions on the economic impact of liability rules are entirely theoretical,
without apparent awareness of these departures from limited liability or of the
fruitful area for empirical research that they provide. With so many categorical
assertions as to the economic consequences of limited liability resting solely on
theoretical analysis, a view reflecting empirical data would provide a refreshing
and more compelling presentation. The economists' views are, of course, of
considerable intellectual interest, but the accuracy of their description of the
business world is at least open to question when they ignore the wealth of
historical experience.
This questionable accuracy is particularly apparent with respect to the fun-
damental question of the possible content of a rule other than limited liability.
None of the analyses reviews the history to determine which alternatives have
in fact been tried. Thus, some analyses assume that the alternative to limited
liability is unlimited joint and several liability. 211 Other analyses assume that the
alternative to limited liability is pro rata liability.sZ Although there is occasional
249. See K. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 139-43 (1974); R. POSNER,
EcoNoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW § 14.04 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter cited as R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
AN.YSIS); Hicks, supra note 54, at 11; Orhnial, Limited Liability Laws and Corporate Finance,
in LIMrrED LIABILIrY AND THE CORPORATION 179 (T. Orhnial ed. 1982); Clark, The Regulation of
Financial Holding Companies, 92 HARv. L. REv. 789, 825-36 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Clark 1;
Clark, Duties of the Corporate Debtor To Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505, 540-53 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Clark 111; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6; Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull,
supra note 6; Jensen & Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305 (1976); Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent,
Subsidiary. and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 589 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Landers 1); Landers, Another Word on Parents, Subsidiaries and Affiliates in Bankruptcy, 43
U. CH1. L. REV. 527 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Landers l1]; Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems:
Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REv. 259, 262-65 (1967); Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note
6; Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 499, 521-24
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Posner, Rights of Creditorsl.
250. Meiners, Mofsky, and Tollison discuss the unlimited liability rule in Massachusetts until
1830 and the apparent lack of impact on the number of incorporations. Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison,
supra note 6, at 362.
251. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 90; Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull,
supra note 6, at 130, 132, 137, 148 n.51; Hicks, supra note 54, at 11; Jensen & Meckling, supra
note 249, at 331; Orhnial, supra note 249, at 180. Halpern, Trebilcock, and Turnbull, recognize Ihat
a rule of pro rata liability would be more efficient. Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbul, supra note
6. at 137.
252. See, e.g., Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,
62 AM. EcoN. REV. 777, 788 (1972); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 249, at 337.
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recognition that both alternatives are theoretical possibilities, no analysis appears
to recognize that in different jurisdictions and at different times both alternatives
have actually been in effect. For example, as noted previously, joint and several
liability prevailed in England until 1855, while pro rata liability prevailed in
California until 1931. Further, there is no apparent awareness that pro rata
liability may take either of two very different forms, both of which have been
law in a number of jurisdictions.
1. Theoretical Advantages of Limited Liability
Economists have noted a number of theoretical advantages that are attrib-
utable to limited liability. Professors Arrow, 2"1 Manne, 25 4 and Meiners, Mofsky,
and Tollison 211 point out that limited liability is a method of shifting risk. To
the extent that insurance is available to cover the risk, the significance of limited
liability diminishes. Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel also note that
limited liability is important because it encourages division of labor in the publicly
held corporation, and therefore, contributes to the growth of large scale firms
and economic activity generally.25 6 Limited liability and the diversified portfolios
such liability perverts, encourage the separation of the functions of investment
and management. Many of the advantages of limited liability that have been
suggested in the literature reflect this general conclusion advanced by Easterbook
and Fischel.
a. Avoidance of Dangerous Exposure of Absentee Investors to Risk
The widespread distribution of shares of the larger corporation makes the
shareholder an investor without the opportunity (and presumably the desire) to
participate in the management of the corporation. It leads to the separation of
ownership and control under which the imposition on absentee investors of
liability for the debts of the corporation exposes investors to risks of the business
reflecting a decisionmaking process from which they are far removed and for
which they bear no realistic responsibility. Such liability is not only hazardous
for investors, but also is incompatible with generally accepted views of fairness.",
Exposure to the risk of liability under such circumstances must be a significant
deterrent to investment. The degree of deterrence can be determined only by
empirical studies, but it is certainly not unimportant. Theoretically, an increase
in the expected rate of return would offset such exposure to ri~k. However, as
has been eloquently noted, the potential dimensions of such risk under conse-
quential damage rules are enormous.258 Some risk averse investors may not be
prepared for such enormous risks under any circumstances.25 9 The return required
by other investors would limit the amount of financing that could be accom-
253. K. ARROW, supra note 249, at 139-40.
254. Manne, supra note 249, at 262.
255. Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 6, at 362.
256. Easterbook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 93-94.
257. See Hicks, supra note 54, at II.
258. See Diamond, supra note 31, at 22-24.
259. Miller suggests that in some cases credit rationing rather than rate increases will occur.
See Miller, Credit Risk and Credit Rationing: Further Comments, 76 Q.J. ECON. 480, 487 (1962).
See also Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 6, at 132.
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plished. It would appear that limited liability should contribute in some important
degree to the encouragement of capital investment in enterprises in which the
investor does not participate in the management.3
b. Increased Development of Very Large Enterprises
As the size of enterprises increases, shareholder liability assumes an even
more dramatic significance. Large scale enterprise involves enormous risks that
dwarf the financial resources of all but the wealthiest shareholders. Exposure
to such enormous risks would discourage investment. In addition, the enormous
amounts of capital required necessitates investment by thousands of investors,
further increasing the widespread distribution of shares and the remoteness of
the relationship of shareholders to managerial participation that would make
the absence of limited liability a serious deterrent to investment. 26,
Although this argument obviously is valid to a significant extent, it is
perhaps somewhat overstated in view of the tremendous growth of financial
intermediaries where an ever increasing amount of capital investment is made
by financial institutions rather than by individuals, and where financial insti-
tutions, not individuals, constitute the major influence in capital and stock
markets. Such institutions with large portfolios are in a much better position
than individual investors to diversify against such risks. Further, if the alternative
rule was a form of prorata liability, rather than joint and several liability,
concerns over the scale of the risk would be reduced substantially.
c. Diversification of Portfolios
Limited liability permits investors to invest with more assurance in enterprises
in which they have no managerial participation. Thus, they can significantly
increase the number of their investments and thereby achieve more extensive
diversification of their portfolios, an advantage that is acknowledged as a more
efficient pattern for investment.2 2 Limited liability also facilitates optimal in-
vestment decisions because the availability of diversification encourages risk taking
that would be discouraged under unlimited liability. 26 3
This argument, however, applies only to individual shareholders who do
not have substantial wealth. Wealthy people and financial institutions are in a
position to diversify, notwithstanding shareholder liability. Because financial
institutions now hold about one-half of all shares on the New York Stock
Exchange, the significance of this factor is weakened substantially. 26'
d. Avoidance of Increased Agency Costs
In the absence of limited liability, shareholders exposed to risk beyond their
capital investment reportedly would be under pressure to assert control over the
260. See Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 6, at 123-24; Manne, supra note 249,
at 262-65; Posner, Rights of Creditors, supra note 249, at 503.
261. See Manne, supra note 249, at 262.
262. See Hicks, supra note 54, at 16-17; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 96.
263. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 96-97.
264. See N.Y. STOCK ExcH., FAcT BooK 55 (1985).
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conduct of the business managers. Economists note that, even with limited
liability, investors are under pressure to monitor the activities of the managers
whose decisions will determine the profitability of the enterprise, and accordingly,
the value of their investment. 65 These economists assert that separation of
ownership and control involves significant agency costs in the form of monitoring
and bonding of managers and providing incentive compensation structures to
assure a greater congruence between the objectives of shareholder investors and
managers. 26 In the absence of limited liability, the situation would be even more
serious. Management decisionmaking would not only determine the profitability
of shareholder investment, but in addition, would expose shareholders to the
possibility of substantial liability in excess of their investments. Numerous econ-
omists argue, therefore, that the elimination of limited liability would lead to
substantially increased agency costs. 2
67
e. Avoidance of the Impairment of Capital Market Efficiency
In the absence of limited liability, an investment decision would involve a
judgment of the financial condition of fellow shareholders as well as a judgment
of the financial merits of the enterprise. Creditors would pursue wealthier
shareholders first, 268 and the relative conditions of shareholder wealth would
influence the practical imposition of liability on particular shareholders. (Although
it is not discussed in the economics literature, any legal rule concerning con-
tribution in the event of some form of shareholder liability would also tend to
make the wealth of fellow shareholders a matter of interest.) The cost of acquiring
information regarding the wealth of fellow shareholders and the enterprise itself
would increase because this information would be essential in determining
the selection of new investments and the retention of existing investments.
Furthermore, information costs for corporate creditors are less than for corporate
investors. 269 Raising capital would become less efficient, thus impairing the
operation of the capital markets. Limited liability, accordingly, has been termed
indispensable for an organized securities market. 70
265. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 249, at 308-10.
266. Id. at 312-30.
267. Id. at 331. See also Manne, supra note 249, at 262-63; Orhnial, supra note 249, at 181;
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 92-93; Posner, Rights of Creditors, supra note 249, at 506-
07, 511-12, 515-16.
Meiners, Mofsky, and Tollision do not agree. They contend that there is no incentive to
shareholders to monitor the behavior of managers because the stock market and security prices
provide all the information investors need for investment decisions. See Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison,
supra note 6, at 362-63.
268. John Stuart Mill emphasized this point in the English debate over limited liability. B.
HUNT, supra note 5, at 121-22.
269. See Orhnial, supra note 249, at 185-86; Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 6,
at 123-24; Manne, supra note 249, at 262-63.
Hadden reports that joint and several liability under the 1844 English Act was perceived as
having retarded investment by more wealthy investors because of their concern that creditors would
proceed first against them. Joint Stock Companies Registration, Incorporation and Regulation Act,
1844, 7 & 8 Vict., ch. 110. T. HADDEN, supra note 27, at 21. The Joint Stock Companies Winding
Up Act, 1848, introduced much improved collection procedures. 11 & 12 Vict., ch. 45.
270. See Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 6. at 129-30; Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 6, at 92.
Meiners, Mofsky, and Tollison, however, assert that such monitoring would in fact not occur,
and that this contention is without validity. Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 6, at 362-63.
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This assertion fails to consider the history of the growth of securities markets
in England in shares of joint stock associations with unlimited liability, a
development that occurred during the two centuries prior to the introduction
of limited liability in 1855. Hunt reports that by the end of the seventeenth
century there were flourishing public markets in London and the provinces for
the shares of all major English companies. 2"1 In turn, this growth in the markets
led to the passage of a statute licensing brokers as early as 1697.2 2 Hadden
further states that as early as 1808, the Birmingham Flour and Bread Company
had as many as 8,000 shareholders.27 ' This assertion also fails to take into
account the development of more efficient legal procedures for the enforcement
of shareholder liability as discussed above.
f. Avoidance of Increased Collection Costs for Creditors
It has been asserted that limited liability avoids the need for corporate
creditors to bring expensive and cumbersome individual collection suits against
numerous scattered shareholders of corporations that have defaulted on their
obligations.2 7 4 This assertion overextends itself. After all, even in the absence
of limited liability, the corporation would remain liable for its obligations. The
availability of an additional remedy against shareholders with its attendant costs
of enforcement would in no way impair or render less efficient the existing
remedy against the corporate obligor. This suggestion also fails to consider the
much approved procedures for enforcement of shareholder liability that were
ultimately developed. 27'
g. Avoidance of Increased Costs of Contracting Around Liability
By including limited liability in corporation law, the law in effect creates
an efficient contract term applicable to all transactions. It eliminates the necessity
271. See B. HUNT, supra note 5, at 105-12.
272. 8 & 9 Will. 3, ch. 32 (1697).
273. See T. HADDEN, supra note 27, at 13.
274. See Clark I, supra note 249, at 825; Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 6, at
132.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 210-12.
Perhaps a more valid observation would be that where procedural difficulties have not been
surmounted, the difficulties of enforcing shareholder liability make the remedy illusory and for that
reason not a useful supplement to corporate liability. See Russell v. Men Dwelling in Devon, 100
Eng. Rep. 359 (1788), in which Judge Ashhurst stated:
[ilf damages are recoverable against the county [public corporation], at all events they
must be levied on one or two individuals, who have no means whatever of reimbursing
themselves; for if they were to bring separate actions against each individual of the
county for his proportion, it is better that the plaintiff should be without remedy.
Id. at 362-63.
In 1846, a Massachusetts court addressed this problem. In a suit to enforce bank shareholder
double liability, the court held that a suit by an individual creditor would not lie. The court required
that either all creditors join in a single suit or that one or more creditors file a creditors' bill for
the benefit of all creditors against all shareholders. Crease v. Babcock, 52 Mass. 557, 560 (1846).
Improvements in creditors' bill procedures, and more recently modern class action procedures, have
decisively dealt with procedural problems. In England, The Joint Stock Companies Winding Up
Act, 1848, significantly improved collection procedures through a court-appointed master to oversee
liquidation and the proceedings against shareholders. I I & 12 Vict. ch. 45. The argument, however,
goes to the extent of usefulness of a remedy against the shareholder; it is not an advantage of
limited liability.
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for shareholders to incur the expense of contracting around the liability."' 6 Where
standard contract clauses are available, 2 " as in the English insurance industry
before the adoption of limited liability in The Companies Act, 1862,278 such
costs are trivial. Where, however, standard contract clauses are not available,
limited liability in corporation law saves the costs that otherwise would be
incurred."19
h. Encouragement of Risk Taking
By accomplishing risk-shifting not created in the market place, limited liability
encourages business managers to venture into activities that they would otherwise
not undertake.28 0 Although not all such ventures will be successful, investors
can diversify against such a risk and be reasonably sure of an overall positive
outcome. Society as a whole would then benefit from the increased production.
Professor Arrow suggests that research and development activity provides an
excellent example.28'
According to this view, limited liability is a compensatory alteration to deal
with the failure of the market to achieve adequate risk shifting on its own. It
has a cost: decreased flexibility and -responsiveness to change and innovation.
Arrow regards insurance as preferable, but recognizes that it is not always
available. 282
2. Theoretical Disadvantages of Limited Liability
As against the numerous theoretical advantages of limited liability that have
been suggested, economists generally agree on certain areas of disadvantage as
well.
a. Unfairness and Inefficiency For Tort and Other Involuntary Creditors
A shift in focus from voluntary creditors to involuntary creditors, particularly
tort creditors, causes much of the efficiency advantages of limited liability to
disappear. 283 Tort liability is a cost of the enterprise that limited liability trans-
forms into an externality borne by persons not associated with it. Unlike voluntary
276. See Posner, Rights of Creditors, supra note 249, at 506, 515.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 32-36.
278. 25 & 26 Vict., ch. 89 (1862).
279. Again, Meiners, Mofsky, and Tollison disagree. They contend that there is neither empirical
nor theoretical basis for the assertion. See Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 6, at 363.
280. See K. ARROW, supra note 249, at 137-38; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 97.
281. K. ARROW, supra note 249, at 137-38.
282. Id. at 141.
283. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 249, at 372; Clark I, supra note
249, at 875; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 103, 107, 112; Manne, supra note 249, at
263; Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 6, at 364-67; Posner, Rights of Creditors, supra note
249, at 506-07.
Halpern, Trebilcock, and Turnbull have more reservations. They assert that limited liability is
most efficient, even for tort liability, in the case of large, publicly held corporations because of
the supposed impact of a different rule on the securities markets. They agree with other economists
on the inefficiency of limited liability for tort claimants in the closely held corporation. Halpern,
Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 6, at 147-48.
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creditors, involuntary creditors are unable to contract around the liability rule
or adjust for it by requiring higher compensation. The interposition of limited
liability reduces the incentive to press for cost-justified risk-reduction precautions;
it undermines the deterrent objective of the tort system. 28 Further, limited liability
creates the risk that the parent will escape liability for injuries from dangerous
products simply by creating a subsidiary to produce and distribute them. 85
In their criticism of the conventional economic analysis of limited liability,
Meiners, Mofsky, and Tollison assert that as a theoretical matter, insurance and
price adjustments should eliminate the impact of limited liability on tort claimants.2 6
Schwartz agrees, but notes that these adjustments will not occur in cases of
delayed harm, i.e., where the risk is unknowable at the time. 8 7 On a practical
level, however, the unavailability of such insurance, as well as market imper-
fections and governmental intervention, render such observations quite academic.
In addition to the inefficiency consequences noted above, and the resulting
possibility that corporate structures may be devised to sidestep product liability
and other tort liability, limited liability may also be regarded as fundamentally
unfair to tort victims.288
Complexities enter into the classification of voluntary and involuntary cred-
itors. For example, Professors Halpern, Trebilcock and Turnbull point out that
tort claimants fall into two classes: individuals in their personal capacities and
other businesses.289 They recognize the lack of efficiency and unfairness in
confronting individual tort victims with limited liability. At the same time, they
note that where the tort injures the interests of employees or other businesses
that can anticipate such events and insure against them, limited liability is entirely
acceptable. They express concern about the inability to distinguish between these
very different situations with respect to a rule of liability.
Voluntary creditors who are victims of misrepresentation (Le., fraud in the
inducement), are traditionally treated differently from other voluntary creditors,
and the normal rules with respect to disregarding the entity are not applied.
The explanation is obvious. In view of the misrepresentation, the underlying
transaction, although in form consensual, is not actually voluntary since a consent
obtained by fraudulent means is for legal purposes no consent at all. Similarly,
it can be argued that if voluntary creditors are uninformed or for other reasons,
no genuine bargaining is involved in the transaction, the creditor should receive
the same protection as an involuntary creditor. 290
The alternatives to dealing with the problem of involuntary creditors, other
than the elimination of limited liability, are not obvious. Easterbrook and Fischel
284. See Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 6, at 145-47.
285. See Heitland, Survival of Products Liability Claims in Asset Acquisitions, 34 Bus. LAW.
489, 498 (1979); Kadens, Practitioner's Guide to Treatment of Seller's Product Liabilities in Asset
Acquisitions, 10 U. TOL. L. REV. I, 41-42 (1978); Schwartz, Product Liability, Corporate Structure
and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and The Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 689, 717
(1985).
286. Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 6, at 364-67.
287. See Schwartz, supra note 285, at 714.
288. See Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90
YA E L.J. i, 65-76 (1980) (undermines compensation and makes a mockery of deterrence).
289. See Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 6, at 145-47.
290. See R. POSNE, EcoNoMic ANALYsis, supra note 249, at 380, 382.
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suggest solutions such as minimum capital requirements, mandatory insurance,
imposition of managerial liability, and governmental regulation. 9' Clark suggests
such measures as minimum net worth requirements, insurance, automatic sub-
ordination of claims of sophisticated creditors, or some form of no fault liability
system.2 92 Posner suggests insurance or bonds.2 9 Manne adds that unemployment
compensation and workmen's compensation should be looked upon as partial
solutions.2 94 All of these solutions have obvious serious limitations.
There is considerable confusion on the question of classification of creditors
as voluntary or involuntary. Some classifications rest solely on whether in form
the parties have consented to the relationship that gave rise to the obligation.
This, however, is only the threshhold inquiry. The crucial question is whether
in the market, the injured party had the economic strength to bargain on the
terms of the transaction pertaining to the credit aspects, including a price
adjustment to reflect the financial condition of the other party.2 9 As a practical
matter, if the injured party was not able to bargain on the issue, that party is
essentially in the same position as the involuntary creditor.
As an example of an overly theoretical classification, some economists lump
trade creditors and financial lenders together as voluntary creditors.2 96 However,
other economists readily recognize that many trade creditors are not in a position
to bargain for an adjustment in price to reflect credit considerations.2 9' An
extreme example is the identification of consumers and workers as voluntary
creditors.2 98 Such a classification is unrealistic. Consumers making retail purchases
and workers looking for jobs are rarely in a position to take credit considerations
into account. Such issues play no real role in determining which product the
retail consumer purchases or whether the unemployed worker accepts a job.
Most employees and retail consumers and many trade creditors must
properly be viewed as involuntary creditors. Consequently, the group adversely
affected by limited liability is much larger than a group comprised only of tort
claimants. Therefore, the impact of limited liability on involuntary creditors,
decried by virtually all economists, is much more significant than generally
acknowledged.
291. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 114-17.
292. See Clark I, supra note 249, at 825 n.161; Clark I!, supra note 249, at 540-53.
293. See R. POSNER, EcONoMc ANALYSIS, supra note 249, at 379-80; Posner, Rights of Creditors,
supra note 249, at 520. Posner, however, decries the usefulness of insurance, emphasizing two
factors that most would not find fundamental. He first asserts that corporate managers might neglect
to insure adequately. He then observes that the insurance company might become insolvent. See
R. POSNER, EcoNoMic ANALYSIS, supra note 249, at 379-80; Posner, Rights of Creditors, supra note
249, at 520.
294. See Manne, supra note 249, at 263.
295. It has been suggested that under certain circumstances, price adjustment will not occur.
A creditor may prefer to ration credit rather than adjust the rate. See Miller supra note 259, at
485-87. See also Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 6, at 132 n.40.
296. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 104-07; Manne, supra note 249, at 263;
Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 6, at 359-62.
297. See Posner, Rights of Creditors, supra note 249, at 505.
298. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 104-05 ("Employees, consumers, trade creditors,
and lenders are voluntary creditors. The compensation they demand will be a function of the risk
they face."). But see Posner, Rights of Creditors, supra note 249, at 522-23 (distinguishes between
financial creditors and nonbusiness creditors).
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A crucial question in appraising the general utility of the limited liability
rule as a contribution to a more efficient economy is the relative numbers of
voluntary and involuntary creditors (properly defined) who are affected. Eas-
terbrook and Fischel state flatly that the magnitude of externality (costs of the
enterprise imposed on creditors) has been exaggerated. 29 They rely on two factors.
First, they point to the size of the voluntary creditor group for whom there is
no externality. Second, they note the extent of insurance that transfers the risk
and loss to the insurance carrier, which through the cost of the insurance,
internalizes the cost.
Two observations are in order. First, as noted previously, the inclusion of
consumers, workers, and many trade creditors as voluntary creditors is unac-
ceptable. These groups are simply not in business to bargain for credit and can
only be regarded as involuntary creditors.?0 In the end, financial lending in-
stitutions, large trade creditors, and contract creditors in genuinely bargained
for transactions constitute the voluntary creditors for whom limited liability is
appropriate theoretically.
Second, as noted, insurance is the theoretically desirable solution advanced
by many analysts. The problem is not with its theoretical soundness, but with
its lack of availability. As a practical matter, the solution is largely irrelevant
because of the unavailability of such insurance and the impracticality of expecting
that large masses of retail consumers or employees could, or would, purchase
it, even if it were to become available. To a lesser degree, insurance also has
some of the disadvantages of needing to contract around liability, a disadvantage
emphasized by economists when liability is imposed not on unorganized consumers
or workers but upon business organizations.
b. Unfairness and Inefficiency for Labor Claimants
There is widespread recognition of the undesirable consequences of limited
liability with respect to labor claimants.30 Costs properly attributed to the
enterprise are avoided, and those costs are shifted to persons least able to protect
themselves. Employees have the most severe informational disabilities, the least
ability to diversify, and the least capacity to absorb losses. 02 In recognition of
these factors, bankruptcy law accords labor claimants a priority for ninety days
of wages with a maximum of $2,000. a03 This priority provides such claimants
with priority over most other claims, including government taxes. As reviewed
above, New York and Wisconsin still have statutes that impose liability upon
299. See id. at 104.
300. Thus Easterbrook and Fischel properly acknowledge that voluntary creditors sometimes lack
"sufficient information or incentive to assess risk correctly or to monitor the actions of the debtor."
Id. at 106. Indeed, many, if not most, persons regarded by these distinguished authors as voluntary
creditors, particularly retail consumers, employees, and many trade creditors, lack the economic
strength to make credit considerations a part of the bargain.
301. See Macharzina, supra note 153, at 66; Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supro note 6,
at 149-50; Manne, supra note 249, at 263.
302. See Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 6, at 149-50. Easterbrook and Fischel
surprisingly look upon employees as voluntary creditors, and therefore, in the class for whom limited
liability is appropriate. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 183. No other economists seem
to have gone this far.
303. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1982).
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shareholders or directors for unpaid labor claims.3 Similar statutory provisions
are found in Canada. 05 Writing with a European perspective, Goyder and
Macharzina suggest that as a consequence of limited liability, workers with their
jobs at stake have replaced shareholders as the persons liable for the adverse
consequences of corporate decisions.3°6
c. Encouragement of Excessively Risky Investments
By transferring the risk of liability from shareholders to creditors, limited
liability increases the likelihood of excessively risky investments by business
enterprises; the calculation of risk calculation has been distorted.1 17 This is a
particularly serious problem.
d. Increased Information and Monitoring Costs
It is asserted frequently that the corporate group, particularly the multi-
national group, pursues a policy of group profit maximization in which the
interests of the individual constituent companies are subordinated to the interests
of the group as a whole. 08 This group focus is reflected in intragroup allocations
of resources for new investment to group activities yielding the highest return
for programs of equivalent risk, transfers of funds and personnel, and nonmarket
intragroup transfer pricing policies. Relying on this view, Professor Landers
notes that under a rule of limited liability these allocations inevitably increase
information and monitoring costs. 301 Judge Posner disagrees. On theoretical
considerations alone, and without reference to the very different forces affecting
decisionmaking in the multinational enterprise, Judge Posner rejects the premise
that group profit maximization in fact occurs."10 Without any reference to
available studies of transfer pricing or management structure and decisionmaking
'in the large or multinational corporation, Judge Posner concludes that in order
to provide increased managment incentive for divisional managers and accurate
information on divisional performance, groups normally will pursue a policy of
individual constituent company profit-maximization. 3 " Thus, these supposed ad-
ditional costs do not in fact occur.
This possibility, however, is only one of the factors at work. Numerous
other factors ignored by Judge Posner make for skewed transfer pricing to
304. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 630 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. § 180.40(6)
(1981-82).
305. See CAN. Bus. CORP. ACT, R.S.C. 1974-75, ch. 33, § 114; ONT. BUS. ConP. ACT, R.S.C.
1982, ch. 4, § 131 (directors).
306. See G. GOYDER, THE FUTURE OF PRxVATE ENTERPRISE 18-19 (1951); Macharzina, supra
note 153, at 67.
307. See Orhnial, supra note 249, at 186; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 104-07;
Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 6, at 144-45.
308. See Landers I, supra note 249, at 591-92; Landers II, supra note 249, at 527, 532.
309. See Landers 11, supra note 249, at 532-33.
310. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 249, at 381-82; Posner, Rights of Creditors,
supra note 249, at 513-14.
311. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 249, at 299.
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achieve group interests. Factors reported by other economists ' 2 include transfer
pricing to: take advantage of different tax rates in home and host countries;
minimize customs duties; achieve capital repatriation; sidestep currency controls
and other host country governmental regulations; alleviate political concerns;
and aid in labor negotiations by understating the profitability of local subsidiaries.
Skewed transfer pricing in vertically integrated industries is also a competitive
strategy to concentrate profits in areas of least competition, thus deterring
competition at a later stage. Finally, the skepticism of third world countries as
to the possible role of skewed transfer pricing in distorting the reported prof-
itability of local units of foreign-based multinational enterprises is a recognized
part of the international scene."' These factors cannot be brushed aside simply
by postulating that group maximization should not be expected to occur by
reference to only one of the numerous factors in the calculation. At the very
least, it must be concluded that the foregoing factors contribute to the use of
transfer pricing to achieve global profit-maximization, subject to some restraint
arising from the administrative costs noted by Judge Posner.
e. Impairment of Market
Professor Arrow has observed that limited liability is a departure from the
free market and necessarily impairs its performance." 4 This factor is still another
cost to be considered in striking the theoretical balance.
f. Limited Liability and Misrepresentation
If third parties have been misled about the identity of the entity with which
they are dealing, and have been led to believe that they are dealing with the
parent corporation or controlling shareholders, rather than with a financially
weaker subsidiary or controlled corporation, the case for limited liability dis-
appears. Similarly, if third parties have been misled about the financial condition
of the corporation with which they are dealing, the argument for limited liability
loses its force. Where such fraudulent misrepresentation can be shown, economists
generally agree that elimination of limited liability is sound. ' -"
312. See R. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS 244-49 (1982);
Lecraw, Some Evidence on Transfer Pricing by Multinational Corporations, in MULTINATIONALS AND
TRANSFER PRICING 223 (A. Rugman & L. Eden eds. 1985); R. MASON, R. MILLER & D. WEIGEL,
THE EcoNOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 382 (1975); S. ROBACK, K. SIMMONDS & J. ZWICK,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 465-68 (1977 rev. ed.). As countries become
more sophisticated in dealing with such strategies, their importance should tend to diminish. In any
individual case, the validity of the transfer pricing rests on the outcome of the various vector forces
at work. See M. GHERTMAN & M. ALLEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
86-88 (1984) (empirical studies show variation by industries); OECD COMm. OF FISCAL AFFAIRS,
TRANSFER PRICING AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 71 (1979) ("The practices of MNEs in charging
for such [intragroup] services [rendered by group affiliates) differ widely.")
313. See Caulfield, The Rain Forests, New Yorker 41, 98 (Jan. 14, 1985); Companies Upset
by Tax Credit Plan, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1985, at D5, col. I.
314. See K. ARROW, supra note 249, at 139-43.
315. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 249, at 380, 382; Black, Miller & Posner,
An Approach to the Regulation of Bank Holding Companies, 51 J. Bus. 379, 395-96 (1978);
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 112; Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull supra note 6, at 149;
Posner, Rights of Creditors, supra note 249, at 514, 520-24.
19861
The Journal of Corporation Law
3. Summary
On balance, several conclusions appear evident on a theoretical level. First,
limited liability is not essential for the functioning of the economic order; it
could readily function under another system of liability. The extreme significance
accorded to limited liability in such tributes as those expressed by Presidents
Nicholas Murray Butler and Charles Eliot '16 is hardly justified. This conclusion
clearly emerges from such studies as those of Easterbrook and Fischel; Halpern,
Trebilcock, and Turnbull; and Meiners, Mofsky and Tollison.117
Second, limited liability on the whole seems to serve a desirable function
in creating appropriate incentives for widespread investor participation in the
equity ownership of major corporate enterprise. On one hand, the financial
institutions (including pension funds) that have come to play such a prominent
role in the capital and securities markets could cope with a system other than
limited liability through portfolio diversification. Individuals (including individual
accounts managed by the trust departments of commercial banks), however,
represent a substantial part of the pool of investment funds available for the
needs of the capital and securities markets. A useful condition for assuring the
availability of this vital segment of investment funds is the preservation of limited
liability for individual investors. The pattern of security ownership and the scale
of enterprise might be very different in the absence of limited liability.
Meiners, Mofsky, and Tollison question whether the rule as to liability has
any significant impact at all, but find no compelling reason to change.3 In
questioning the absence of impact of the rule,3t 9 they rely on the Coase theorem
that in the absence of change in transaction and enforcement costs, one legal
rule or another produces no important difference in allocative outcome. 20 Its
soundness, however, rests on the extent to which liability emerges as a result
of bargaining in genuinely negotiated transactions. It also rests on assumptions
that are not always realistic with respect to the extent to the availability of
complete information to all affected parties and the absence of transaction costs.
316. See supra note 5.
317. Easterbrook and Fischel conclude that the rule of limited liability does matter "but probably
not much," depending on the existence of well-developed insurance markets. Easterbrook & Fischel.
supra note 6, at 102. See also Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 6, at 147-48; Meiners,
Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 6, at 352.
318. See Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 6, at 352.
319. See id. at 359-62.
320. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN. I (1960). The Coase theorem
generally is accepted by the economists in discussing limited liability. They also agree that a change
in the legal rule theoretically affects only the distribution of loss, because in the market the shift
in risk is matched by a corresponding shift in interest costs. See Posner, Rights of Creditors, supra,
note 249, at 503-07; Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 6, at 128. Posner and Halpern,
Trebilcock, and Turnbull, however, see changes in information, monitoring, and transaction costs
that make limited liability more advantageous.
In evaluating the validity of the Coase theorem with respect to the allocation of resources, it
is important not to lose sight of the fact that the Coase theorem does not deal with the issue of
the proper distribution of losses. Thus, in the corporate group, interposition of limited liability for
the parent and upstream subsidiaries enables the group to arrange its corporate structure in a manner
that shifts losses arising from enterprise operations from solvent components of the group to the
victims of the torts and contract defaults of insolvent subsidiaries.
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The discussion does not end even if one concludes that limited liability is
generally preferable, or that it is so much part of the existing order that proposals
for change are unrealistic. Although limited liability may be regarded as desirable
overall, those areas in which limited liability is acknowledged as inadequate must
be addressed. The question would then be not the elimination of limited liability,
but the imposition of restrictions on its use.
Moving beyond the threshhold problem of limited liability for the protection
of ultimate investors in the enterprise, separate consideration must be given to
the application of limited liability to corporate groups. When limited liability
is applied to multi-tiered corporate groups, layer upon layer of insulation from
liability can result. The application of limited liability to component companies
of corporate groups is a vital question in the law today that has received
inadequate consideration.
B. Economic Analysis: Limited Liability and Corporate Groups
In the preceding section, the theoretical economic analysis of the rule of
limited liability was reviewed. This review included the presumed impact of rules
of limited and unlimited liability on both business enterprises and ultimate
investors. Most of the discussion in the literature has focused on the respective
positions of the ultimate investors in the enterprise, on the one hand, and the
creditors of the enterprise on the other. These discussions typically ignore or
give only summary consideration to the special problems presented by the
subsidiary companies of a corporate group in which the shareholder is the parent
or another component company of the group, not the ultimate investor. 2'
An examination of the advantages and disadvantages of limited liability, as
applied for the protection of constituent corporations of a corporate group,
reveals several major differences. First, the imposition of liability on the ultimate
investors of the enterprise is not a concern. A rule that imposes liability on the
enterprise for the torts or other acts of its constituent corporations does not
require a change in the rule of limited liability for ultimate investors.
Second, the corporate group analysis does not involve a universe of thousands
and thousands of shareholders of varying degrees of wealth. 22 Instead, the
subsidiary in a corporate group typically involves a single shareholder, its parent.
23
Third, corporate group analysis does not involve thousands and thousands of
shareholders, who are widely separated from participation in management or
control. Within the corporate group, the parent as sole shareholder is almost
invariably engaged in the managerial functions of establishing policy, determining
budget, providing administrative support, and participating in the decisionmaking
of the subsidiary corporation. The degree of involvement varies from group to
group. Fourth, the business of the parent is often integrated economically with
the business of the subsidiary; indeed, in many cases, the two will be conducting
interrelated fragments of a single unitary business.
321. Notable exceptions include Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 110-11; Posner, Rights
of Creditors supro note 249, at 509-16.
322. Fifty corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange on December 31, 1984 had
160.000 shareholders or more. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., FACT BOOK 39 (1985).
323. For a discussion of the problem presented by a partially owned subsidiary, see infra text
accompanying note 338.
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In view of these fundamental changes in the nature of the shareholder and
its relation to the subsidiary corporation, it should be immediately apparent that
many of the presumed theoretical advantages of limited liability simply become
irrelevant in the case of the corporate group. In the following discussion, the
advantages of limited liability generally are reexamined to determine their rel-
evance to the "incredibly complex ' 3 24 special world of corporate groups.
(I) The parent corporation is not an absentee owner, therefore, avoidance of
exposure to risk of absentee investors is not a relevant factor. (2) Because the parent
corporation is the sole shareholder, the necessity of limited liability to encourage
the widespread distribution of shares, a requirement for very large enterprises,
is also irrelevant. The parent facing the risk of liability for the debts of its
subsidiaries is in a position to diversify its portfolio and spread the risk.
Economists recognize that a similar ability to diversify on the part of financial
institutions who are ultimate investors would make the imposition of limited
liability significantly less important than in the case of individual investors lacking
the ability to diversify. 2 This factor would be as applicable to corporate groups
as to financial institutions.
(3) Avoidance of increased agency costs is another factor to be considered. In
the corporate group, the parent corporation is usually engaged to some degree
in management of the subsidiary. The subsidiary typically is managed as part
of the same enterprise with varying degrees of decentralization. Under such
circumstances, the need to establish congruence of the interests of the manager
and the owner-investor, with its attendant presumed agency and monitoring costs
simply do not arise. The associated problem of senior management monitoring
the acts of subordinate managers does not change where part of the enterprise
is operated as a subsidiary rather than as an unincorporated branch or division.
Thus, this consideration is also largely irrelevant.
(4) Concerns for the avoidance of increased information costs are irrelevant
because full information about the subsidiary's operations is always available
to the parent corporation. (5) In the case of the wholly owned subsidiary, there is
no market for the subsidiary's shares, and therefore, concern with the impairment
of the efficiency of the capital markets is an irrelevant consideration. In the
case of the partially owned subsidiary, however, there may well be a market
in which the publicly held shares are traded. In that limited case, this advantage
is still relevant.
(6) Avoidance of creditors' enforcement costs is not a relevant consideration
because creditors will be able to proceed directly against the parent. Therefore,
the alleged spectre of litigation against innumerable shareholders to enforce
shareholder liability would not arise. (7) Avoidance of the cost of contracting around
liability unlike so many of the other factors continues to be applicable. (8) The
encouragement of risk taking is perhaps the most significant factor in the case
of corporate groups. It is particularly important in the case of conglomerate
enterprises that are considering investment in areas unrelated to the existing
businesses of the group. 3 6 In the integrated group where the additional investment
324. See Hadden, supra note I, at 274.
325. See Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 6, at 298.
326. See Posner, Rights of Creditors, supra note 249, at 512.
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represents a horizontal or vertical extension of activities already being undertaken,
the factor is less significant. Professor Hadden notes that "it is arguable that
[without limited liability] some worthwhile but risky ventures which might be
undertaken by large groups would not be undertaken at all. 3 127 He reports that
this factor has deterred legislators in Germany and the European Economic
Community from imposing absolute liability on holding companies for the debts
of their subsidiaries in the existing German law23l and under the Proposed Ninth
Directive of the European Economic Community. 29
Professors Halpern, Trebilcock, and Turnbull conclude that unlimited liability
would seem the most efficient for subsidiary companies and other tightly held
companies. 30 Professors Easterbrook and Fischel conclude that recognition of
the foregoing factors helps explain why, in the opinion of some scholars,",
courts are more willing to "pierce the veil" in cases of parent/subsidiary
corporations than in cases of individual controlling shareholders.1 2 They suggest
that a rationale for limited liability, in the case of parent and affiliate cor-
porations, is to avoid giving unaffiliated firms a competitive advantage. Un-
fortunately, they point to taxicabs for their example, where they erroneously
imply that limited liability is the rule for intragroup tort liability in taxicabs
because groups would otherwise be at a disadvantage in competing with "true"
single-cab firms.13" This analysis is not an uncommon misreading of the taxicab
cases. In fact, intragroup tort liability on an enterprise basis has been widely
imposed on taxicab groups conducting an integrated taxi fleet operation.' 4 At
the same time, the ultimate investors in the group frequently have been shielded
from liability,"' which no doubt has led to the confusion. 3 6 Consequently, this
explanation of competitive disadvantage is questionable.
327. Hadden, supra note 1, at 281.
328. German Stock Corporation Act (Konzernrecht), Law of Sept. 6, 1965, Aktiengesetz BGB
I[1 4121-1 (1965). See P. BLUMBERG supra note 4. at 642-50.
329. Proposal for a Ninth Directive Based on Article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty on Groups,
C.E.E. Doc. No. XV 593/75-E; Doc. No. XI 215/77-E. See P. BLUMBERG, supra note 4, at 789-
94.
330. See Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 6, at 148, 150.
331. See, e.g., Hackney & Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. PITr.
L. REV. 837, 872-73 (1982); Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 Tax. L. REv. 979, 992 (1971).
The author has not yet concluded his comprehensive study of the voluminous case material
available. As of the completion of this Article, he was not fully convinced that this has occurred.
332. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 110-11.
333. Id. at Ill.
334. E.g., Mangan v. Terminal Transp. Sys., 157 Misc. 627, 284 N.Y.S. 183 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd
per curiam, 247 A.D. 853, 286 N.Y.S. 666 (App. Div. 1936), motion for leave to appeal denied,
272 N.Y. 676 (1937); Robinson v. Chase Maintenance Corp., 20 Misc. 2d 90, 190 N.Y.S.2d 773
(Sup. Ct. 1959). See Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 343 (1947).
335. Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 419, 223 N.E.2d 6, 9 (1966); Robinson v. Chase
Maintenance Corp., 20 Misc. 2d 90, 92-93, 190 N.Y.S.2d 773, 775-76 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
336. Several New York cases illustrate the distinction. In Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d
414, 223 N.E.2d 6 (1966) the Court of Appeals refused to impose liability on an individual controlling
shareholder for the obligations of an undercapitalized controlled corporation whose only assets
consisted of two used taxicabs and the statutory minimum of $I0,000 of insurance. The decision did
not involve imposition of liability on the other controlled corporations of the group which functioned
as part of an integrated fleet allegedly .'operated ... as a single entity, unit and enterprise' with
regard to financing, supplies, repairs, employees, and garaging." Id. at 416, 223 N.E. 2d at 7. The
Court of Appeals left little doubt that the other controlled corporations in the fleet would be liable,
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Judge Posner argues that the consolidation or pooling of the assets and
liabilities of affiliated companies that would result from the elimination of limited
liability would not reduce the risk of creditors overall.3 37 Presumably this argument
assumes that the added liabilities of the affiliate would offset the added assets.
This situation is unlikely. The classic case in this area is that of the solvent
parent and the insolvent subsidiary. Imposition of liability on the parent in these
cases would benefit creditors of the enterprise at the expense of the shareholders'
equity in the parent. Thus, the position of creditors would be enhanced.
A final word on the significance of partially owned subsidiaries is in order.
As recognized, the existence of minority shareholders may reintroduce some of
the advantages of limited liability that would be irrelevant in the case of a sole
shareholder. This situation, however, occurs only in a minority of cases. A
study by Curhan, Davidson, and Suri of 189 major United States multinational
companies with 11,198 subsidiaries found that 8,059 or about seventy-two percent
were wholly owned.3"'
In summary, most, but not all, of the suggested arguments for limited
liability simply do not apply to corporate groups, or at least are not always
fully applicable. The extension of layers of limited liability to the tiers of
subsidiaries within corporate groups lacks most of the theoretical justification
that has been advanced in defense of the rule. Accordingly, reconsideration of
the rule is in order, particularly since application of limited liability to corporate
groups appears to have been accidental.
C. Economic Analysis and Modified Forms of Shareholder Liability
Dramatic examples of a corporate society functioning under a system other
than limited liability include California from 1849 to 1931, England until 1855," -9
stating:
lilt is one thing to assert that a corporation is a fragment of a larger corporate
combine which actually conducts the business .... It is quite another to claim that
the corporation is a "dummy" for its individual stockholders who are in reality carrying
on the business in their personal capacities for purely personal rather than corporate
ends . . . . In the first, only a larger corporate entity would be held financially responsible
.. while, in the other, the stockholder would be personally liable.
Id. at 418, 223 N.E.2d at 8-9 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Robinson v. Chase Maintenance Corp., 20 Misc.2d 90, 190 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Sup. Ct. 1959) upheld
a complaint against the component corporations of a group operating a taxicab fleet and dismissed
it against the controlling individual shareholders.
Halpern, Trebilcock and Turnbull have had similar difficulties with the outcome in Walkovszky.
Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 6, at 119.
337. See R. POSNER, EcoNoMic ANALYSIS, supra note 249, at 382.
338. See J. CURtHN, W. DAVDSON & R. SURI, TR.AcINO ThE MULTINATIONALS 143 (1977):
Parent Ownership (1975) Wholly owned (95%-00%) 8,059 Majority-owned (51%-94%), 1,025; Co-
owned, 725; Minority-owned (5%-49%), 1,036; Unknown 353; Total, 11,198.
339. Strictly speaking, the English experience involved joint stock associations, not corporations.
Since joint stock associations rather than corporations were the typical English vehicle for the
conduct of business enterprise and subsequently received limited liability under The Companies Act,
1855 and other statutes, they may be regarded as fully comparable for present purposes.
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Massachusetts until 1830, and Rhode Island until 1847. 340 In addition, modifi-
cations of limited liability such as double (or even triple) shareholder liability
for corporations generally were common during most of the nineteenth century.
341
Double liability provisions for national and state bank shareholders survived
until the 1930s. 342 Thus, limited liability in its purest form is a relatively modern
phenomenon in the United States.
The jurisdictions that adopted legal rules imposing some form of liability
on shareholders for corporate obligations followed a number of different models.
Most jurisdictions, as in Massachusetts until 1830, Rhode Island until 1847, and
England until 1855 imposed joint and several liability. Other jurisdictions followed
the widespread rule in the United States through most of the nineteenth century
that imposed double or triple liability, measured by the original capital investment.
Still others, notably California, and for a short period Georgia, adopted pro
rata liability.
Any review of limited liability for the protection of ultimate investors should
include discussion of these historical developments. They are, of course, of lesser
significance in the discussion of the validity of the interposition of multiple
layers of limitation of liability within corporate groups.
1. Pro Rata Liability
In the discussion by economists, most have assumed that the only alternative
to limited liability was joint and several liability, apparently unaware of
California's eighty years of experience with pro rata liability. Thus, the utility
of pro rata liability as an alternative to limited liability has not been examined
adequately by commentators.
As noted previously, 3 there are at least two forms of pro rata liability,
both of which were used in California. Under one early California statute
applicable only to mining corporations, shareholders were primarily and directly
liable for company obligations to any creditor, subject to a maximum representing
the shareholder's proportional ownership of the stock of the corporation applied
against the total debts outstanding M The same form of pro rata liability was
340. For a detailed discussion of these examples, see supra text accompanying notes 8-49, 84-
148, and 160-73. In theory, such liability was tempered by the shareholder's right to contribution
from fellow shareholders. See 1. ANGELL & S. AMES, supra note 98, §§ 227-29; Joint Stock Companies
Registration, Incorporation and Regulation Act, 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., ch. 110. There are no references
in the literature that throw light on the effectiveness of enforcement of liability against shareholders
or the practical usefulness of the right of contribution.
341. See J. HURsr, supra note 79, at 27. See also supra text accompanying notes 174-92.
342. See Vincens, supra note 183.
343. The California experience with limited liability is discussed supra at notes 160-73.
344. Act of Apr. 14, 1853, ch. 65, § 16, 1853 Cal. Stat. 87, 90 as amended by Act of Apr.
27, 1863, ch. 460, § 1, 1863 Cal. Stat. 736-37. Under this statute pro rata did not mean that the
liability to each creditor was restricted to the shareholder's proportion of the particular debt in
issue. In theory, at least, this greatly increased the effectiveness of the creditor's remedy. However,
in view of a litigant's difficulty in determining the total amount of the corporate debts (a necessary
step in the determination of the shareholder's maximum liability), it is not surprising that California
ultimately utilized the alternative model. Some jurisdictions refused to permit an action for benefit
of a single creditor. Crease v. Babcock, 52 Mass. 557, 560 (1846).
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utilized in a number of early statutes. 315 Under another early California statute
applicable to corporations generally that served as a model for subsequent
California statutes until 1931, shareholders were primarily and directly liable to
creditors for their proportional share of each creditor's claim. 4 6
Accordingly, theoretical examination of the advantages and disadvantages
of both models of pro rata liability deserve an important place in any academic
discussion of limited liability or alternative systems of shareholder liability for
corporate obligations. Although most theoretical analyses fail to do so, some
commentators discuss pro rata liability briefly, adopting the latter type of pro
rata liability as their model.
-4 7
Halpern, Trebilcock, and Turnbull suggest that under a system of pro rata
liability, shareholders would not be "as interested in monitoring the wealth
composition" of fellow shareholders. 348 There would be a greater incentive on
the part of shareholders to ensure that the company did not undertake projects
that would increase risk. In brief, they conclude that in a number of ways, pro
rata liability would avoid some of the theorized costs arising in both limited
liability and unlimited liability systems. The increased, although still limited, risk
would be reflected by an increase in the return demanded by investors and a
lower equilibrium price for corporate securities.1
4 9
In a brief discussion of pro rata liability, Manne stresses two factors. He
points to the fact that some shareholders have received shares for promotional
activities or for other noncash consideration, and thus would be unwilling or
unable to shoulder a burden for corporate debts. 50 This illustration is not
representative. Further, it may describe some smaller or newly financed enter-
prises, but is hardly helpful in reviewing alternative systems of liability for
corporations of significant size, including corporate groups.
Manne also points to the alleged practical difficulties of collecting "frac-
tional" liabilities from large numbers of shareholders. 31' This problem is sig-
nificant, although in view of the procedural reforms as discussed above, is not
as serious as Professor Manne suggests. 52 In corporate groups, the problems in
345. Hatch v. Burroughs, It F. Cas. 795, 796 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1870) (No. 6203); Branch v.
Baker, 53 Ga. 502, 512-13 (1874); Lane v. Harris, 16 Ga. 217, 227 (1854) (legislative bank charters).
See I C. BEACH, supra note 168, § 154, at 280 (1891).
346. Act of Apr. 22, 1850, ch. 128, § 32, 1850, Cal. Stat. 347, 350, as amended by Act of
Apr. 27, 1863, ch. 518, 551, 1863 Cal. Stat. 766. See supra text accompanying notes 160-73.
347. See Manne, supra note 249, at 262; Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 6, at
137-38. Orhnial recognizes that under unlimited liability, there would be "economic inducements" to
develop cost minimizing arrangements such as "agreed limitation of lshareholderl liability to pre-
determined sums." Orhnial, supra note 249, at 187. Pro rata liability and double or triple liability
appear to provide the limitations that he has in mind.
348. Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 6, at 137-38.
349. Id.
350. Manne, supra note 249, at 262.
351. id.
352. The New York Stock Exchange estimates that total institutional holdings would represent
one-half of the stock listed on the Exchange. N.Y. STOCK ExcH., FACT BOOK 55 (1985). Further,
even where individual shareholders are concerned, the mature stage of the old creditors' bill provided
an efficient remedy against all shareholders residing in the state of incorporation, and reduced the
problems of proof in other jurisdictions to minor proportions. See generally Abbot, supra note
210. See also Crease v. Babcock, 52 Mass. 557, 560 (1846). Modern class action practice further
facilitates the prosecution of such actions.
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prosecuting actions against a large number of individual shareholders, even to
the extent not cured by improved procedural remedies, simply do not arise. In
most cases, the parent (or other group affiliate) is the only shareholder. Even
where there are minority shareholders, a single action against the parent (or
other affiliated shareholder) represents an efficient and substantial solution to
the collection problem.
Since empirical studies of the California experience are apparently not
available, a conclusion as to how well the California system actually functioned
cannot be drawn. However, the California system, as well as earlier, more
sweeping systems of unlimited shareholder liability in New England and England,
survived for a significant period. A further conclusion is that the economic life
of the area functioned reasonably well despite the very different legal rule.
Whether the economy would have functioned better under a system of limited
liability remains at issue. At any rate, whatever the virtues of the pro rata
liability system, it did not ultimately survive in a world operating under limited
liability.
2. Double or Triple Shareholder Liability
Double or triple shareholder liability is another model of imposition of
liability upon shareholders in addition to their original investment. As has been
noted, for decades double liability was a normal feature of the general corporation
laws of most states as well as the rule for all national banks and most state
banks." 3 Nevertheless, it failed to survive the Great Depression. In the case of
banks, double liability was superseded by deposit insurance which was viewed
as a more effective means of providing protection for this important class of
bank creditors. In the case of corporations generally, the usefulness of double
liability in protecting creditors was apparently outweighed by the additional
burden imposed on shareholders who had already lost their entire investment.
3. Summary
Whatever the lessons of history with respect to the relative usefulness of
pro rata or double liability as variant ceilings on shareholder liability, this issue
is of minor importance. The critical question remains whether limited liability
should be applied to the components of corporate groups, regardless of the
application of the rule to ultimate investors. That issue is entirely separate from
the question of whether any change in the rule for limited liability for ultimate
investors or consideration of some variant system such as pro rata liability or
double liability may deserve attention.
V. APPLICABILITY OF LIMITED LIABILITY TO
COMPONENTS OF CORPORATE GRouPs
Once corporate power was extended to include acquisition and ownership
of the shares of another corporation, the creation of parent and subsidiary
corporations and the development of business enterprises, frequently fragmented
353. See supra text accompanying notes 174-95.
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into a number of affiliated corporations for the overall convenience of a corporate
group, became possible. At the same time, the judicial system extended limited
liability to parent corporations in their roles as shareholders of their subsidiaries
without any apparent consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of this
fundamental decision. If a subsidiary corporation constitutes only one of a number
of components of a corporate group collectively conducting a fragmented unitary
business, the very basis for the establishment of limited liability as a matter of
general legal policy"-4 disappears. m'
VI. CONCLUSION
In the preceding sections, the historical, economic, and legal authorities
dealing with limited liability in general and with corporate groups in particular
have been reviewed. At different times in Anglo-American history and in different
areas, limited liability was rejected as the legal rule. Nevertheless, the economic
system in the jurisdictions in question functioned reasonably effectively. In fact,
it is still not clear whether a legal rule imposing some form of shareholder
liability made any significant difference in the nature or dimensions of economic
activity. On the other hand, intuitively, it is difficult not to suppose that it
would discourage investment by individuals.
Further, the economic advantages asserted in support of limited liability,
advantages that supposedly increase the efficiency of the economic system, are
not accepted universally even among the economists. More importantly, such
conclusions, even if valid generally, are largely irrelevant when the special case
of intragroup liability is considered.3 16 Finally, limited liability was accepted as
a legal principle at a time when corporations generally lacked the power to
acquire and own the shares of other corporations and thereby function as parent
corporations. When such power was finally recognized, the extension of limited
liability from protection of ultimate investors to protection of parent corporations
followed almost automatically, without any apparent consideration of the sound-
ness or the desirability of the extension of the principle to create successive
layers of protection against liability within the corporate group.
Both as an academic and a political matter, the application of limited
liability to corporate groups has never undergone the scrutiny and debate that
such a fundamental extension of the doctrine deserves. With the increasing
354. Extension of limited liability to reflect a deliberate bargain between the parties presents
a very different problem; irrespective of the general liability rule under corporation law, limited
liability could, of course, survive as a matter of contract law.
355. If a subsidiary is not a fragmented part of an integrated business and represents a separate
business within a conglomerate group, intragroup liability may present a different issue. Issues
requiring examination in such an inquiry include the extent of decentralization of decisionmaking;
the extent of group financial, administrative, and personnel support and interrelationship; the extent
of public identification of the separate business of the subsidiary as an activity of the group; the
extent of continued participation of former management in the direction of the subsidiary (in those
cases where the subsidiary had been acquired after having been previously operated under independent
ownership); and the extent to which the subsidiary significantly represents an investment diversification,
rather than an extension or expansion of the business or businesses in which the group is currently
engaged.
356. Although conglomerate groups may present a stronger case for the application of limited
liability, further analysis is still required in the individual case.
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predominance of large corporate groups on the world economic scene and the
increasing emergence of an interdependent world economic order, such a reex-
amination is not only desirable, but inevitable.
Torts and employee obligations present the most urgent areas for recon-
sideration. These questions are urgent within each country. They are equally
urgent within the world community as a result of the increasing importance of
the multinational enterprise. With world attention focused on recent environ-
mental catastrophes involving local subsidiaries of foreign multinational enterprises
(such as the Bhopal and Channel oil spill disasters) and with increasing labor
concern on multinational problems of plant relocation and work transfer, the
liability of the parent and upstream subsidiaries for the obligations of their local
subsidiaries is a problem of increasing seriousness throughout the world. The
legal rule inevitably will be on the world agenda for consideration.

